BEN S. GILMER ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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The court held that a judge who recuses herself from a case is disqualified from entering further orders or final judgments, even if she claims to have decided the case before recusal. The final judgment entered after recusal was void.
A judge who recuses herself is disqualified from proceeding further in the case and cannot enter final judgments or orders, regardless of when the decision was reached. The final judgment entered after recusal is void and of no effect.
[1] A judge who recuses themself from a case is legally equivalent to a disqualified judge and can proceed no further.
[2] A judge's order of recusal, even if not specifying grounds, implies the judge is unfit to proceed further in the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that a judge who is disqualified can proceed no further in the case.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that a disqualified judge lacks authority to take further action in a case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn March 7, 1975, a circuit judge entered an order recusing herself from the case on the court's own motion and directed the clerk to reassign the cau…
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HOBSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in favor of the appellee on March 12, 1975. The record on appeal shows that on March 7, 1975 the circuit judge who entered the final judgment had on the court’s own motion entered an order recusing herself from “hearings on the above .styled cause.” This order further directed the clerk to re-assign the cause to another circuit judge.
The question on appeal is whether or not a judge may recuse himself on his own motion and thereafter enter further orders or final judgment. It is well settled that a judge who is disqualified can proceed no further in the case. Vaughn v. State, Fla.App.3d 1969, 226 So. 2d 443; Kells v. Davidson, 1951, 102 Fla. 684, 136 So. 450. The appellee suggests that there is a distinction between a disqualified judge and a judge who on his own motion recuses himself. We are not persuaded that there is a distinction which would remove a recused judge from the law applicable to a disqualified judge.
Webster’s Dictionary defines “disqualify” as “To deprive of the qualities necessary for any purpose; to render unfit.” In the same dictionary, “recuse” is defined as “To reject; esp., to except to (a judge), as interested or incompetent.”
The order of recusal and transfer on the court’s own motion does not state the reasons therefor. However, we must assume that while the reason or reasons might not be sufficient to disqualify under the applicable statutes, they were sufficient to preclude the judge from proceeding further in the case.
The appellees also take the position that the judge heard the final arguments of counsel on appellees’ motion for summary judgment and had reserved her decision in order to deliberate on the oral arguments and the authorities cited by counsel prior to the entry of the court’s own motion of recusal. This being so, the court merely entered its final judgment in written from, subsequent to her recusal, after having reached her decision prior to her recusal. To support this contention, the appellees rely heavily on the order of recusal wherein the court recused herself “from hearings on the above styled cause,” and there were no further hearings prior to the entry of the final judgment.
The record on appeal shows only that the order of recusal was entered on March 7, 1975 and the final judgment was entered subsequent thereto on March 12, 1975. Under these circumstances and under the law as established by Kells and Vaughn, supra, we hold that the final judgment was void and of no effect.
The final judgment is vacated and set aside and the cause remanded with directions that it be taken up before a circuit judge not disqualified to act in the further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Anne Marie Fischer v. Honorable Francis X. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1986)…468 So. 2d at 1035. We note that the opinion does not reflect whether the trial judge had previously announced his judgment on the merits. Similar holdings appear in Weiner v. Weiner, 416 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). We find it appropriate to restate the principles governing disqualification of judges, as set forth in Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086-87 (Fla.1983): In Florida, there are four separate expressions concerning the dis…
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Schwartz v. Schwartz, 431 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…e judge entered the order. Moreover, while it is true that once a trial judge recuses himself, further orders thereafter are void, Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977); Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Weiss v. Miami National Bank, 320 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), it is also the rule that a trial judge who recuses himself has the authority to enter final judgments on issues already tried, Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil C…
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Rogers v. State, 341 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…he cause for further proceedings before himself. These proceedings were conducted over the objections of the appellant. We must reverse. Once the trial judge recused himself, further orders of his were void and of no effect (Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So. 2d 171 (Fla.2d DCA 1975)). This cause is remanded to proceed upon trial judge’s order of recusal. REVERSED AND REMANDED. MAGER, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nelson v. Lord, 102 Fla. 684 (Fla. 1931)
- Frank W. Kells and wife Rosa C. Kells v. Davidson, 102 Fla. 684 (Fla. 1931)
- Vaughn v. State, 226 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)