COMMERCIAL BANK OF KENDALL, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LAWRENCE J. COSTLEY, A/K/A LARRY J. COSTLEY, AND JOAN E. COSTLEY, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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A bank appeals a trial court's judgment awarding it only $500 in attorneys' fees and no costs in a promissory note collection action. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court's fee award was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded for reassessment of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
The trial court's award of $500 in attorneys' fees and nothing for costs is not sustained by the evidence. The judgment is reversed and remanded for the trial court to reassess reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
[1] An appellate court should not interfere with the findings of fact of a trial judge, sitting non-jury, unless there is an absence of substantial competent evidence to supp…
[2] When an appellate court finds a lack of substantial competent evidence to support a trial court's findings, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing p…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an appellate court should not interfere with the findings of fact of a trial judge, sitting non-jury, unless there is an absence of substantial competent evidence to support such findings. However, on appeal when such evidence is found to be lacking, even when the evidence is considered in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, it is an appellate court's duty to reverse.”
Establishes the standard of review for appellate courts reviewing trial court findings in non-jury cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCommercial Bank of Kendall held a $120,000 promissory note from Lawrence J. Costley due July 29, 1974. After the note went unpaid, the bank filed suit…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, plaintiff below, brings this appeal from a final judgment of the trial court awarding it attorneys’ fees and an order of the trial court denying its motion for a rehearing.
Appellant held a promissory note from appellee, Lawrence J. Costley, for the principal amount of $120,000.00 plus interest due and payable on July 29, 1974. The note was not paid when due and on September 18, 1974, appellant filed a complaint against appellee seeking damages and other relief, including the establishment of a lien and garnishment. Thereafter, a garnishment prior to judgment was issued and appellant posted a bond in the amount of $270,000.00 for which it was required to pay the premium.
After the garnishment, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement whereby appellee paid $123,000.00 to appellant. This amount did not include attorneys’ fees and costs which by the agreement were to be determined by the trial court.
After a non-jury hearing on the issues of attorneys’ fees and costs, the trial court entered a final judgment dated December 17, 1974, which awarded appellant $500.00 in attorneys’ fees and denied it any amount for costs. From the judgment, appellant appeals.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in entering the judgment because it was contrary to the evidence. Appellee contends that there was competent substantial evidence to support the award of $500.00 as reasonable attorneys’ fees and to deny costs to appellant.
It is a well settled proposition of law that an appellate court should not interfere with the findings of fact of a trial judge, sitting non-jury, unless there is an absence of substantial competent evidence to support such findings. However, on appeal when such evidence is found to be lacking, even when the evidence is considered in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, it is an appellate court’s duty to reverse. Apeco Marina, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Fla.App.1974, 301 So. 2d 136; Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Company v. Novack, Fla.App. 1973, 284 So. 2d 433; C. T. Heath v. First National Bank in Milton, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 883; and see 2 Fla.Jur. Appeals § 343.
In the instant case, the record shows that the legal activities undertaken and the costs incurred by appellant’s counsel were justified under the circumstances. Also, it appears that the trial court’s award of only $500.00 as attorneys’ fees and nothing for costs is not sustained by the evidence. We have considered the record, all points in the briefs and arguments of counsel in the light of the controlling principles of law and have concluded that reversible error has been shown. Therefore, for the reasons stated, and upon the authorities cited, the judgment appealed is reversed and remanded to the trial court for the assessment of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
Reversed and remanded.
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Deen v. Zaremba Fla. Co., 497 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…support the trial court’s finding that defendant never authorized an advertising program, we reverse that portion of the final judgment denying plaintiffs’ claim for reimbursement for advertising expenses. See Commercial Bank of Kendall v. Costley, 324 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (where substantial competent evidence to support a trial judge’s findings of fact is lacking, appellate court’s duty is to reverse). The remaining points raised on appeal and cross-appeal have been considered and found to b…
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Airborne Freight Corp. v. Fleming Int'l Airways, Inc., 423 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…owledge). Thus, in this instance, there was no competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Airborne terminated the agreement prematurely and therefore no support for any award of lost profits.1 Commercial Bank of Kendall v. Costley, 324 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The trial court also awarded Fleming $10,806.56 for “repositioning” of the aircraft because the charter agreement was “prematurely terminated.” To the extent that this award was dependent on the finding of premature termination,…
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Rubinstein v. Murray Mester, 362 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…ellee, have [*987] concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings of the trial court that appellant breached the contract in question and that appellee was entitled to damages. See, e. g., Commercial Bank of Kendall v. Costley, 324 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Apeco Marina, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 301 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Manchester Insurance & Indemnity Co. v. Novack, 284 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); and Heath v. First National Bank of Milton, 213 So.…
Authorities Cited
- C. T. Heath and wife v. First Nat'l Bank IN Milton, 213 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. & Charles Hines v. Novack, 284 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Apeco Marina, Inc. v. ST. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)