DALE E. FRANKLIN, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE (STATE)
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Franklin was convicted of robbery and appealed the admission of his confession, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the confession was valid because Franklin voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and complete re-warning was unnecessary given the brief time lapse and substance reminder.
The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. A complete repetition of Miranda warnings was unnecessary because only thirty minutes elapsed between the original full warnings and the confession, the defendant was reminded of the warnings before giving his statement, and the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights.
[1] A confession is admissible when a defendant, after being advised of his constitutional rights, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives those rights.
[2] A defendant's initial refusal to give a statement does not preclude him from later voluntarily confessing.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Before taking Franklin's confession, was it necessary to fully repeat his constitutional rights to him? No. Did Franklin voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights? Yes.”
The court directly answers the two critical legal questions, establishing that full re-warning was not required and that a valid waiver occurred.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFranklin was arrested and immediately advised of his constitutional rights. He declined to talk about the crime or have an attorney present. Approxima…
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MILLS, Judge.
Franklin seeks reversal of a judgment of conviction and sentence based on a jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery. The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a confession made by him.
Immediately after his arrest Franklin was advised of his constitutional rights. When asked if he wanted to talk about the crime, Franklin replied, “No, not right now.” He gave the same answer when asked if he wanted an attorney. Within fifteen minutes of his arrest, Franklin was delivered by the arresting officer to the jail. The arresting officer informed the officer at the jail, to whom he delivered Franklin, that he had advised Franklin of his constitutional rights, and that Franklin did not want to give a statement. The officer at the jail inquired of Franklin if he had been advised of his constitutional rights, and if he understood them. Franklin responded, “Yes.” He was asked if he wanted an attorney. He said, “No.” Upon being asked if he wanted to give a statement, he said that he did. Approximately thirty minutes after his arrest, Franklin gave a written statement admitting his participation in the robbery. As a preface to the signed confession, Franklin stated that he had been advised of his constitutional rights; that he wanted to make a statment without the presence of an attorney; and, that he had not been threatened, coerced, forced, or promised anything to make the statement.
Before taking Franklin’s confession, was it necessary to fully repeat his constitutional rights to him? No. Did Franklin voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights? Yes.
Because only thirty minutes lapsed between the time he was given full Miranda warnings and the time he gave his confession; and because he was in substance reminded of the warnings before giving his confession; it was unnecessary to fully repeat the warnings. See Melero v. State, 306 So. 2d 603 (Fla.App.3d, 1975). A defendant has as much right to waive his right to be silent as he has to insist on the right. The validity of the waiver depends upon it being voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324 (Fla.App.4th, 1969). The facts presented to us clearly show a waiver that meets this test.
Affirmed.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.
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DeLUCA v. State, 384 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…v. Diamond, 516 F. 2d 118 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976); Maguire v. United States, 396 F. 2d 327 (9th Cir. 1960); and U. S. ex rel. Henne v. Fike, 563 F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1977). In Franklin v. State, 324 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the First District held a 30-minute interval did not necessitate re-advising a defendant who had been reminded of earlier warnings. Although no directly controlling Florida authority has been cited to us, we conclude that the d…
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Battle v. State, 338 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…right to waive his right to be silent as he has to insist on the right. The validity of the waiver depends upon it being voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324. (Fla.App. 4th, 1969).” * * * Franklin v. State, 324 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) See also Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976). We find that a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver was made by the defendant in the present case. The record shows that the defendant requested an attorney in response…
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Nettles v. State, 409 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…e this as a clear indication he had changed his mind and was now willing to make a statement. A defendant is entitled to waive his right to remain silent, the question becoming whether the waiver was freely and intelligently made. Franklin v. State, 324 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The record here does not indicate Nettles’ waiver was anything other than voluntary. Appellant’s other issues can be disposed of summarily. All of the alleged errors involve matters in which the trial judge has significant disc…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Victoriano Melero v. State, 306 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Nunez v. State, 227 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)