CORPORATE AIR FLEET OF TENNESSEE, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
SAM ELLIS AND FLORIDA INTEROCEAN, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLEES
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The court held that filing and maintaining a lawsuit in Florida does not constitute 'doing business' under Chapter 613, F.S.1973, thus allowing enforcement of a foreign judgment.
Appellant sought to enforce a Tennessee judgment against appellees in Florida. The trial court abated the action, finding appellant non-compliant with…
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McNULTY, Chief Judge.
Appellant sought to establish in this state a Tennessee final judgment obtained against appellees upon personal service in Tennessee. Since appellant was not a corporation authorized to transact business in the State of Florida within the contemplation of Chapter 613, F.S.1973, the trial court granted a motion to abate the action until compliance therewith in accordance with the provisions of that chapter. We reverse.
It is settled in this state that the mere filing and1 maintenance of a law suit does not constitute “doing business” within the state within the purview of Chapter 613, supra, so as to preclude access to our courts, unless the suit or action is based upon a contract or obligation resulting from a transaction, other than an isolated one, in the state.1 There is nothing in this case to suggest that the underlying cause of action in the Tennessee suit arose in Florida or that, if it did, it was more than an isolated transaction. In fact, to the contrary, it appears that appellant’s sole contact with the State of Florida is the suit itself which, in turn, was necessitated by the physical presence of appellees in Citrus County.
We think, therefore, Chapter 613, supra, is inapplicable. A contrary holding would either violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution if the underlying cause of action were merely an isolated transaction or, in the case of a valid foreign judgment as here, contravene the full faith and credit clause thereof.
Accordingly, the order appealed from should be, and it is hereby, reversed; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. . See Crockin v. Boston, Store of Ft. Myers (1939), 137 Fla. 853, 188 So. 853; McMullen v. Inland, Realty Corporation (1933), 113 Fla. 476, 152 So. 740 (Special Concurring Opinion reported in 156 So. 481); Al Wilson’s Power-Ful Displays, Inc. v. Morgan Adhesive, Inc. (Fla.App. 3d 1972), 259 So. 2d 166.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Batavia, Ltd. v. United States, 393 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…o allege or prove a negative. See Al Wilson’s Power-Ful Displays, Inc. v. Morgan Adhesive Inc., 259 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); see also McMullen v. Inland Realty Corp., 113 Fla. 476, 152 So. 740 (1933); Corporate Air Fleet of Tennessee v. Ellis, 324 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). I agree with the majority that the trial court may prevent abuse of its process or procedures by requiring Batavia to provide information sufficient to alleviate the court’s concern regarding the nature of the corporate entity.…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- State v. Swanson, 116 Fla. 464 (Fla. 1934)
- Emil Crockin v. The Boston Store of Ft. Myers, Inc., 137 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1939)
- McMullen v. Inland Realty Corp., 113 Fla. 476 (Fla. 1933)
- AL Wilson's Power-Ful Displays, Inc. v. Morgan Adhesive, Inc., 259 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)