BOWYER ET AL.
v.
CANNON ET AL.
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The Florida Supreme Court held that once a case is dismissed under Section 45.19 for inactivity, the trial court loses jurisdiction if no petition for reinstatement is filed within one month. The court granted prohibition to prevent the trial court from proceeding with the case after that deadline had passed.
No. Once a dismissal order is entered in strict conformity with Section 45.19, the trial court's jurisdiction terminates if no petition for reinstatement is filed within one month. The trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate or quash the dismissal order when the motion was filed more than one month later, and all proceedings and orders entered after that deadline are null and void.
“the order of dismissal became final and the jurisdiction of the court came to an end when the motion to reinstate was not made within one month.”
Establishes the fundamental rule that jurisdiction is lost if reinstatement is not sought within one month
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCooper filed a bill of complaint for foreclosure on September 17, 1951. On July 9, 1952, relators filed answers to interrogatories. On July 10, 1953, …
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MATHEWS, Justice.
In this cause rule nisi in prohibition issued. Answers have been filed.
Respondent, Cooper, filed bill of complaint on the 17th of September, 1951, for the purpose of foreclosing certain claims of lien against some real property. Various pleadings and steps were taken in the case until July 9, 1952, on which date the relators here filed answers to interrogatories which had been propounded by said respondent. On the 10th of July, 1953, a motion was filed to dismiss the cause because no action had been taken by the filing of any pleading, order of the Court, or otherwise, for a period of more than one year. At the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss, an affidavit of the Clerk of the Circuit Court was filed which set forth that the last instrument filed in the proceeding was on July 9, 1952. Based upon this motion and affidavit an o’rder of dismissal was entered on July 10, 1953, in accordance with the provisions of Section 45.19, F.S., F.S.A. On the 14th day of August, 1953, the respondent, Cooper, filed a motion to quash and vacate the order of dismissal and to strike the motion to dismiss. On August 18, 1953, a hearing was had on the two last-mentioned motions and on the 21st of August, 1953, the Judge made an order vacating and quashing the order of dismissal which had theretofore been entered. Thereafter, notice was given of a motion for appointment of a Special Master; Special Master was appointed by the Judge to take testimony; and notice was given by the Master that he would take such testimony.
It does not appear from the record that any petition to reinstate the case upon good cause shown was at any time filed in this cause. The only thing shown is' the motion to quash and vacate the order of dismissal and to strike motion to dismiss and motion for release of funds which was filed August 14, 1953, which was more than one month after the order of dismissal had been made and entered.
The only question presented necessary for the determination of this cause is: did the Chancellor have jurisdiction of the cause after the expiration of a period of one month from the date of an order dismissing the cause in strict conformity with Section 45.19, F.S..F.S.A.?
Section 45.19, F.S.,F.S.A., is controlling in this case. It is unnecessary to quoté the same in full. The motion to dismiss was made in strict conformity with the terms of the statute and said motion was granted and order of dismissal made by the Chancellor. After the entry of such order more than one month passed without any petition for reinstatement having been filed, as allowed and provided for by said Section 45.19, F.S.,F.S.A. In the case of Ivy H. Smith Co. v. Moccia, Fla., 59 So. 2d 629, 630, this Court said:
“ * * * the order of dismissal became final and the jurisdiction of the court came to an end when the motion to reinstate was not made within one month. * * * Scarlett v. Frederick, 147 Fla. 407, 3 So. 2d 165; State ex rel. Berry v. Trammell, 134 Fla. 154, 183 So. 819; Ex parte Smith, 168 Ala. 179, 52 So. 895.”
See also B. & L. Trucking Co v. Loftin, Fla., 63 So. 2d 276.
It is apparent, from the answer, that the Chancellor was under the impression that he had jurisdiction to control, set aside or quash his orders at any time during the term because of a rule. Such rule to which reference was made applies only in common-law actions where terms of court are provided for. There is no fixed term of court for the Chancery Court. Even if there was such a fixed term, no 'circuit court-adopted rule could supersede the statute, Section 45.19, F.S.,F.S.A., which is controlling in this case.
In this case it' appears that at the time of the filing tif the motion to quash and vacate the order of dismissal more than one month had passed since the entry of the order of dismissal in compliance with Section 45.19, F.S.,F.S.A., and that the jurisdiction of the Court had come to an end. The proceedings and orders taken or entered more than one month after the entry of the order of dismissal are null and void, and the Circuit Court is without jurisdiction to proceed further in this cause.
The rule. nisi is made absolute and the writ of prohibition as prayed for is granted.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, jj., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Wilds v. Permenter, 228 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…cause is not made within one month thereafter, the order of dismissal becomes final and the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and the cause is finally ended. Zukor v. Hill, Fla. 1956, 84 So. 2d 554; Bowyer v. Cannon, Fla. 1953, 68 So. 2d 564; B & L Trucking Co. v. Loftin, Fla. 1953, 63 So. 2d 276; Ivy H. Smith Co. v. Moccia, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 629. In the order of reinstatement it was commented, “ * * * [T]he defendant has waived any right to a continuance of the trial and/or of any r…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Fate Avery, Jr. v. The Honorable Gene Williams, 222 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…hat when the thirty days for reinstatement had expired the trial court was without power to reinstate a cause. See: Ivy H. Smith Co. v. Moccia, Fla.1952, 59 So. 2d 629; B&L Trucking Co. v. Loftin, Fla.1953, 63 So. 2d 276; Bowyer v. Cannon, Fla.1953, 68 So. 2d 564; Morrison v. Chambers, Fla., 82 So. 2d 594. Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent an inferior tribunal from exercising a jurisdiction it does not possess or one that has expired. State v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 192 So. 2d 175; Bowyer v. C…
Authorities Cited
- Scarlett v. Frederick, 147 Fla. 407 (Fla. 1941)
- B & L Trucking Co., Inc. v. Loftin, 63 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1953)
- State v. Hon. Worth W. Trammell, 134 Fla. 154 (Fla. 1938)