EARL R. LITTLE, APPELLANT,
v.
HAZEL M. LITTLE, APPELLEE
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Earl Little appealed an interlocutory order referring his wife's dissolution of marriage petition to a general master. The appellate court held that while temporary alimony and child support matters could properly be delegated to a master, the determination of property rights could not be delegated because such judicial power is not delegable and property rights determinations are final and bar future actions.
The chancellor properly delegated temporary alimony and child support matters to the general master under Florida Civil Procedure Rule 1.200(a), but erred in delegating the determination of property rights to the master because judicial power is not delegable and property rights determinations in a dissolution judgment are final and bar future actions. The denial of the motion to dismiss the petition for dissolution was proper.
[1] A chancellor may appoint masters and refer certain matters to them, but the court's judicial power is not delegable and cannot be abdicated in whole or in part to the mas…
[2] A chancellor errs in delegating judicial power to a general master to determine the property rights of parties in a dissolution of marriage case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A chancellor may appoint masters and refer certain matters to them as a matter of procedure, but the court's judicial power is not delegable and cannot be abdicated in whole or in part by the chancellor to the master.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that judicial power cannot be delegated to masters, forming the basis for reversing the delegation of property rights determination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHazel Little filed a petition for dissolution of marriage seeking child support, attorney's fees, permanent custody of their minor child, and a specia…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant husband takes this interlocutory appeal to review (1) an order denying his motion to dismiss his wife’s petition for dissolution of marriage, (2) an order of referral to a general master, and (3) an order denying his motion to suppress the notice of hearing before the general master. Hazel Little, appellee, filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to appellant, Earl Little. In the petition she sought child support, attorney’s fees, permanent custody of their minor child and a special equity in certain realty. Earl filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds it was defective and failed to state a proper cause of action. This motion was denied. Hazel then noticed a hearing before the chancellor on her motion for alimony, support, fees and injunctive relief seeking to have Earl removed from the marital home. After a hearing, the trial judge entered an order referring appellee’s petition for alimony and child support and a determination of property rights to a general master pursuant to RCP 1.490. Hazel noticed a hearing before the general master and Earl moved to suppress the notice. The chancellor denied the motion to suppress.
Appellant primarily argues that the chancellor abused his discretion in delegating his authority to a general master to hear matters pertaining to alimony, child support, and a determination of property rights. We find the contention with respect to the matter of the property rights has merit.
A chancellor may appoint masters and refer certain matters to them as a matter of procedure, but the court’s judicial power is not delegable and cannot be abdicated in whole or in part by the chancellor to the master.1 Bell v. Bell, Fla.App.1975, 307 So. 2d 911. Where the question of property rights is raised, the chancellor must determine the issue since the final dissolution of marriage judgment settles all of the property rights of the parties and bars any future action to determine such rights. See 10A Fla.Jur. Dissolution of Marriage § 71 (1973). Thus, we conclude that the chancellor erred in delegating his judicial power to the general master to determine the property rights of the parties in this case. However, his referral to the matters of temporary alimony and child support to the master was proper. See RCP 1.200(a).
We also considered appellant’s remaining argument on appeal that the chancellor erred in denying his motion to dismiss the petition for dissolution of marriage and find it to be lacking in merit.
Accordingly, that portion of the order of referral to the general master with respect to determining the property rights is reversed. In all other respects the order of referral is affirmed as are the orders denying the motions to dismiss and to suppress notice of hearing.
So ordered.
. However, where all parties to the case consent, the trial judge can delegate to a master his authority to determine the issues of law and fact in the cause before him.
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Little v. Little, 348 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…ial court’s order even though given every opportunity to do so. See Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla.1976). The orders appealed from are affirmed. . Previous appearances in this court of this litigation are reported at Little v. Little, 325 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Little v. Little, 336 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).…
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Ben-Hain v. Tacher, 418 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…r itself and determine whether under the law and facts the findings and recommendations of the master are justified prior to entry of a final judgment in accordance with the master’s report. Lyon v. Lyon, 54 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1951); Little v. Little, 325 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1976); Bell v. Bell, 307 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). It is also well-settled law, however, that a master’s report is clothed with a presumption of correctness and should be approved and adopted b…
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COX v. COX, 490 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…ferral to a master is required only where the master is given authority to determine “all issues, both fact and law.” Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 325 So. 2d 475, 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). See also Little v. Little, 325 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1083 (Fla.1976). The instant case does not present such a situation, since only specific, limited matters were referred to the master for determination. Therefore, appellant’s failure to timely object constitu…
Authorities Cited
- Bell v. Bell, 307 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)