SHARON HAMMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Sharon Hammond was convicted of selling heroin based on testimony from a police trainee identifying her in a bar. Hammond appealed claiming the trial court erred in refusing to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who allegedly identified her. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that while it was a close question, no error occurred because other witnesses placed her at the bar and the informant had no unique knowledge unavailable to others.
No error was committed in refusing to disclose the confidential informant's identity. Although it was a close question under the standards of Roviaro v. United States and Spataro v. State, the informant was not referred to in the evidence, did not directly participate in the transaction, and other testimony beyond Moss's testimony placed Hammond at the bar and contradicted her alibi.
[1] Disclosure of a confidential informant's identity is not required when the informant did not directly participate in the transaction and their knowledge is not unique or…
[2] A court may refuse to order disclosure of a confidential informant's identity if the informant is not referred to in the evidence and did not directly participate in the…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the confidential informant was not referred to in the evidence and did not directly participate in the transaction, and that there was testimony other than Moss' placing appellant at the bar and contradicting her alibi”
Court's reasoning for why the informant's identity did not need to be disclosed—the informant had no unique knowledge that others lacked about whether Hammond was at the bar.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice trainee Moss inquired in the Pick-Up Bar about purchasing heroin from a confidential informant who allegedly pointed out Hammond. Moss identifi…
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[*23] SMITH, Judge.
Appellant earnestly insists that her conviction for sale of heroin was marred by the trial court’s refusal before trial to order disclosed the identity of the confidential informant who, according to the State, named and pointed out appellant in the Pick-Up Bar when the witness Moss, a police trainee, inquired from whom he might buy heroin.
The confidential informant was the only known witness to the transaction in the bar besides Moss. Moss’ identification testimony was riddled with doubt and contradictions. It was corroborated, however, by another officer who testified to having seen appellant at the bar on the afternoon of the alleged offense. Appellant and her alibi witnesses testified that she was in her apartment all afternoon.
We have carefully considered appellant’s argument under the standards of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), and Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla.App.2d, 1965). It is a close question, and one which the trial court may well have been asked to reconsider at trial in light of the testimony adduced by the State. But in view of the facts that the confidential informant was not referred to in the evidence and did not directly participate in the transaction, and that there was testimony other than Moss’ placing appellant at the bar and contradicting her alibi, we conclude that no error was committed. In the circumstances of this case, the critical issue was whether appellant was in the Pick-Up Bar on the afternoon in question, and on that issue the confidential informant had no unique knowledge that was 'unavailable to other witnesses within and without the bar. We have considered the appellant’s other points and find them likewise unavailing.
Affirmed.
BOYER, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (U.S. 1957)
- Spataro v. State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)