WILLIE DOUGLAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this probation revocation appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's revocation of Douglas's probation and five-year sentence for breaking and entering, despite psychiatric evidence that Douglas was unable to understand the nature and wrongfulness of his original offense due to mental illness and alcoholism. The court held that because Douglas was competent to defend the probation revocation proceedings and his earlier guilty plea was not withdrawn, the trial court had no duty to set aside the conviction.
The trial court had no duty to set aside the conviction or withdraw the guilty plea, and the appellate court had no power to do so. Because the probationer was competent to defend the probation revocation proceedings, the psychiatric evidence about his understanding of the original offense did not require modification of the underlying conviction, particularly where counsel made no request to withdraw the guilty plea.
[1] A sentencing court is not required to revisit a defendant's guilty plea to the underlying offense when revoking probation for violations of its terms, even if psychiatric…
[2] Probation violations, even if related to a defendant's underlying illness, are still violations of probation terms.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“was not able to understand the nature, quality and wrongfulness of his acts”
Describes the psychiatrist's conclusion regarding Douglas's mental state at the time of the original offense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWillie Douglas, a 45-year-old black male with a medical history of schizophrenic reaction, brain syndrome related to epilepsy, and alcoholism, pleaded…
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SMITH, Judge.
This case presents an unusual question concerning the sentencing court’s duty when, during proceedings to revoke an accused’s probation for repeated violation of its terms, a court-appointed psychiatrist reports that the probationer is able to understand and assist counsel in the revocation proceedings but “was not able to understand the nature,- quality and wrongfulness of his acts” constituting the original offense.
The trial court in this case found that appellant substantially violated the terms of his probation three times and revoked the probation theretofore twice restored, sentencing appellant to imprisonment for five years for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemean-or, to which appellant pleaded guilty months earlier. Appellant is a 45-year old black male with an established medical history for treatment of “schizophrenic reaction and brain syndrome related to epilepsy and alcoholic conditions” and no prior convictions except for disorderly conduct. The examining psychiatrist believes appellant suffered an alcohol-induced epileptic seizure before the break-in offense and that his state at that time was “characterized by confusion, clouding of consciousness and inappropriate acts and a lessening of volitional controls.” Appellant is chronically ill. His addiction to alcohol compounds his mental illness and resulted in the revocation of his probation, one of the terms of which was that he not use intoxicants to excess and that he reside at the Springfield Alcoholic Rehabilitation Community and observe its rules which forbade drinking.
The psychiatric evidence at hand indicates that appellant was able to understand and could assist his counsel in defending the charge of probation violation and it implies that appellant was similarly competent to enter his earlier plea. Appellant’s trial counsel made no request for leave to withdraw his guilty plea in the light of the psychiatric report. Rule 3.-170(f) R.Cr.P. No such request is made on this appeal. In these circumstances the trial court had no duty, and we have no power on this appeal, to roll back the months and enter for appellant a plea of not guilty. The probation violations, though surely related to appellant’s illness, were violations nevertheless. The sentence was not illegal. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943).
Affirmed.
BOYER, C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
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Love v. State, 359 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Monge v. State, 286 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Bocchino v. Wainwright, 231 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Childs v. State, 190 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Gibson v. State, 173 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). Douglas v. State, 326 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Dickenson v. State, 261 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Capetta v. Wainwright, 203 So. 2d 609 (Fla.1967); Belsky v. State, 231 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).…
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State v. Brest, 421 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…nsel. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the effect of the fact that the order under review was entered upon a claim, that of involuntariness, which was never advanced by the defendant himself. But cf. Douglas v. State, 326 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). . At the end of the 3.850 hearing, the court said: THE COURT: There is no point in making any argument. This is based upon my being convinced by the defendant’s testimony and the plea colloquy that the defendant was totally co…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1943)