EASTERLIN
v.
MAYO
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The Florida Supreme Court held that 'gain time' earned by a prisoner through good behavior does not reduce the length of parole supervision or diminish the parole commission's authority to revoke parole. The court rejected a petitioner's argument that calculating good-behavior credits against his sentence would shorten his parole period, thereby depriving the commission of jurisdiction to revoke his parole.
The parole commission's jurisdiction to revoke parole is measured by the term of the original sentence and is not diminished by gain time credits. The statute unambiguously establishes that the parole commission retains authority to revoke parole throughout the original sentence period, regardless of good-behavior time reductions.
“We think the statute is unambiguous and means that the jurisdiction of the parole commission to revoke is measured by the time of the original sentence and does not fluctuate because of time gained by good conduct.”
This establishes the core holding that gain time does not affect the parole commission's jurisdiction to revoke parole, which is determined solely by the original sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner was sentenced on August 20, 1945, to two consecutive four-year terms (eight years total) for forgery convictions. He served until November …
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THOMAS, Justice.
A writ of habeas corpus was issued by this Court and now, upon it and the return, we undertake to answer the question which the parties agree is presented, that is, whether “gain time” earned by a prisoner in the penitentiary prior to his release on parole must be taken into consideration in computing the length of time he is to remain on parole.
The applicable statute contains the provision that “No person who has been placed on parole shall 'be discharged therefrom by the commission prior to the expiration of the term for which he was sentenced * * Sec. 947.24, Florida Statutes 1941, and F.S.A. The petitioner was sentenced 20 August 1945, to two years on each of four convictions of forgery, the sentences to-run consecutively. He served until 6 November 1945, when he escaped. He was captured 22 November 1945 and thereafter his conduct was good. On 25 October 1949, he was granted a parole which was revoked 14 January 1953.
It is petitioner’s contention that when the time he gained by good behavior after his re-incarceration 22 November 1945 is deducted from the eight-year period fixed in the sentence, and when the period is thus shortened, the date of expiration occurred before the revocation of parole, 14 January 1953, so the parole commission had lost jurisdiction.
We cannot agree. We think the statute is unambiguous and means that the jurisdiction of the parole commission to revoke is measured by the time of the original sentence and does not fluctuate because of time gained by good conduct.
The identical question was presented to us in Boyette v. Mayo, 6 June 1951, and we denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus without recording, however, the reasons for our ruling.
The writ is discharged.
ROBERTS, C. J., and HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Turner v. Louie L. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…for which he was sentenced, or until he shall have been duly pardoned . . .” That was held to mean, unambiguously, “that the jurisdiction of the parole commission to revoke is measured by the time of the original sentence . . . .” Easterlin v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla.1954). Chapter 63-83, Fla. Laws, codified that decision: When a person is placed on parole the commission shall determine the period of time the person shall be on parole, and such time shall not exceed [a] maximum term for which he has b…
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Gibbs v. Louie L. Wainwright, 302 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…lt with an analogous statute. The courts of Florida have held that gain time is forfeited by operation of the provisions of § 947.23(2) F.S. whenever a parole is revoked. Dear v. Mayo, 1943, 153 Fla. 164, 14 So. 2d 267; Easterlin v. Mayo, Fla.1953, 69 So. 2d 181; Shiplett v. Wainwright, Fla.App.1967, 198 So. 2d 647. Federal courts have also held that by violating parole, a prisoner forfeits all credit for good conduct time. Smith v. Blackwell, 5th Cir. 1966, 367 F. 2d 539; Smith v. Attorney General, 5th Cir…