HEPS ET AL.
v.
BURDINE'S, INC.

Fla. | 1954-01-05
ROBERTS, C. J, and SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ, concur.
69 So. 2d 340 Florida Supreme Court (1954) Caution
Cited by 38 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A customer injured on an escalator at a department store sued for negligence, alleging the store failed to prevent a person with a stroller from boarding the escalator. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint, holding that store owners are not required to station attendants on escalators or anticipate injuries caused by the negligent or rude conduct of other customers absent some inherent danger.


Holding

The store owner is not liable. A proprietor of a public building is not required to station attendants on escalators to control who uses them or to anticipate and prevent injuries caused by the negligent or discourteous conduct of one customer toward another, absent inherent dangers in the equipment or peculiar circumstances making the proprietor a joint tortfeasor.


Key Quotes

“The person injured must point out and bring his action against the one who caused the injury.”

Establishes that liability attaches to the party actually responsible for the injury, not merely to a proprietor present at the time.

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Facts & Procedural History

In October 1949, the plaintiff stepped onto an escalator at Burdine's department store in Miami to travel between floors. A third person carrying a st…

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, Justice.

TERRELL, Justice.

Appellee is the owner and operator of a large department store in Miami. The amended complaint alleges that in October 1949, appellant was a customer in said store and stepped on an escalator to be transported from the fourth to the third floor, that a third person with a stroller in which there was a child stepped on the escalator to appellant’s rear, that as the escalator moved the stroller was pushed against or struck the plaintiff knocking her over and catapulting her downward against the escalator causing her bodily injuries.. The amended complaint further alleges that the escalator was not constructed to accommodate strollers, that in permitting them to be conveyed on it defendant created a dangerous and hazardous condition. A motion to dismiss the amended complaint was granted and final judgment was awarded .defendant. The plaintiff has appealed from that judgment.

The point for determination is whether or not the trial court committed error in granting the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, accompanied by a final judgment .for defendant.

The answer to the question turns on whether or not defendant was negligent in not keeping attendants standing by to see that no one got on the escalator with a stroller or in not posting signs to forbid the use of the escalator by persons with a stroller. It is alleged that, at. the time of the accident, the store was crowded with customers, that the escalator was crowded with passengers who were unruly, that' they were shoving and pushing each other, that the escalator was not constructed to accommodate strollers and was not intended for conveying such luggage. It is not charged that the escalator was improperly constructed, that it did not move in perfect order, that it was improperly operated or that for other reasons it was negligently constructed or operated so as to prove it 'to be unsafe and dangerous. The whole theory of the amended complaint is that it was not properly guarded, and that defendant knew or should have known that it was unsafe for transporting strollers. ;So far as the record discloses it was being operated in a normal or routine manner when the accident occurred.

For every wrong there is a remedy, is one of the first principles of hornbook law that confronts the law student, but with it is the equally important principle that the remedy be sought against the negligent party. It may be that the person who stepped on the escalator with the stroller manipulated it negligently, but that question is not before us. The allegations of negligence go to the lack of attendants to restrict those using the escalator and to guard their conduct while being conveyed on it. We are not convinced that under the circumstances a case was made against defendant as to either charge.

The law always follows, it never precedes that which the public deems to be a felt necessity for it. It is common practice for mothers to convey their babies in strollers along the streets, into stores and public places. If one trips or falls over them -due to negligence of the mother, he could not recover against the city or the owner of the building, absent peculiar circumstances that would make the accused a joint tort feasor. The record in this case is devoid of any such peculiar circumstances. The point is that the owner of a public building may not necessarily be held liable for injury to a customer or spectator therein because he happened to be present when" the lightning strikes. It must be shown that the owner negligently failed where the law, custom, or innate danger requires diligence.

There is nothing inherently dangerous about a mother conveying her child in a stroller, along the street, through-a public building or down an escalator and we do not yet require that injury from such an operation will be anticipated by the proprietors of the building. The use of escalators in large stores is common practice and we indulge the presumption that those who use them will conduct themselves as ladies and gentlemen, and so long as they do this, we do not require the presence of attendants to determine who shall ride them or who shall not be permitted to do so.

We do not take issue with the current suggestion that old fashioned courtesy is a lost art, that knighthood is a fading memory or that there is something “nutty” about one who dares display the Sir Walter Raleigh brand of chivalry, but even so, we have not reached the point that we impose a penalty on one in business for delicts resulting from the crude manners, rude -conduct, and total disregard of the feelings of others exhibited by customers in his place of business. Courtesy and good manners are not yet ritualistic even if a more sensitive response to them would improve our cultural pattern. The mere fact that one is injured in a public place is not enough to fix responsibility for a cause of action. The person injured must point out and bring his action against the one who caused the injury.

Escalators, like turnstiles, revolving or swinging doors, and other equipment for buildings and places where the public is invited, are considered necessary and standard equipment for the dispatch of crowds and the owners are not required to guard them with attendants or to anticipate that one customer will without cause assault another in their operation. The same rule applies to common carriers when such devices are brought in question. Rich v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 316 Mass. 615, 55 N.E. 2d 953; Feith v. Kresge Department Store Corp., 114 N.J.L. 286, 176 A. 386; Weinstein v. R. H. Macy and Company, 163 Misc. 61, 296 N.Y.S. 341; Jacob v. City of Pittsburg, 330 Pa. 587, 198 A. 639; O’Neill v. S. S. Kresge Company, 317 Mass. 768, 58 N.E. 2d 247; Andrews v. Narber, Fla., 59 So. 2d 869; Miller v. Shull, Fla., 48 So. 2d 521 and Foley v. Hialeah Race Course, Fla., 53 So. 2d 771.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J, and SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ, concur.


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Citator

Cited By (19 total)

  • Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
    …ts of actionable negligence under any theory is the existence of a duty owed to the person injured by the person charged with negligence. Belmar, Inc. v. Dixie Building Maintenance, Inc., 226 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); see also, Heps v. Burdine, 69 So. 2d 340 (Fla.1954). The plaintiff must demonstrate that he is within the zone of risks that are reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Crislip v. Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for review denied, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1981); Palsgraf v. L…
  • Justa Patricia Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
    …la. 3d DCA 1988). As the plaintiff, Delgado bears the burden of proof at trial, and for Delgado to prevail, “it must be shown that the owner negligently failed where the law, custom, or innate danger requires diligence.” See Heps v. Burdine’s, Inc., 69 So. 2d 340, 341-42 (Fla.1954). Under Florida law, a business owner owes two duties to a business invitee such as Delgado: (1) to take ordinary and reasonable care to keep its premises reasonably safe for invitees; and (2) to warn of perils that were known or…
  • Westchester Exxon v. Marcelo Valdes and Maribel Valdes, 524 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …ejido’s vehicle or any other automobile at Westchester’s station. Absent knowledge of the hazardous propensities of Mejido’s automobile, Westches-ter could not be required to warn or protect Valdes from the danger. See Hall; Heps v. Burdine’s, Inc., 69 So. 2d 340 (Fla.1954); Kolosky v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 472 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 482 So. 2d 350 (Fla.1986). The instant record does not support a finding that the danger created by Mejido’s automobile existed for a period sufficient…

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