LUTHER R. ROGERS, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BREVARD COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM AND THE SCHOOL BOARD OF BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANTS,
v.
LEAH JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court dismissed a teacher's suit as moot because she had already been reinstated and paid back salary, avoiding the need to address the statute's constitutionality.
A case seeking reinstatement and back pay becomes moot once the teacher is reinstated and compensated, requiring dismissal without reaching constitutional questions.
[1] A case becomes moot and must be dismissed when the plaintiff has obtained the relief sought, precluding judicial review of constitutional questions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA teacher sued to regain her teaching position and back compensation. By the time of review, the teacher had been reinstated and paid her back salary.…
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ROBERTS, Justice.
We here review by certiorari an interlocutory order passing upon the constitutionality of a state statute.1
Suit was instituted below for the purpose of regaining a teaching position and compensation of the plaintiff, respondent herein. An examination of the file in this cause reveals, and the parties concede, that the teacher is back in her position and payment of her back salary has been made. To that end and for that purpose, the mission of the suit has been accomplished and the cause should be dismissed because the controversy is moot. In such posture, it is not necessary to pass upon the constitutionality vel non of the statute in question either in the interlocutory order or any final decree.
We, therefore, remand the cause to the trial court with directions to expunge the interlocutory order sub judice and dismiss the cause.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. . The cause reached us in the form of an interlocutory appeal, but the appropriate remedy because of the interlocutory nature of the order is a petition for writ of certiorari. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company, 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1974), Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Constitution of Florida.
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Citator
Cited By
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Avila S. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977)…ment Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla.1973). Insofar as the order appealed is interlocutory in nature, we have treated the appeal papers as a petition for certiorari. Harris v. Beneficial Finance Co., 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla.1976); Rogers v. Johnson, 326 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1976); Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1974). Because of the importance of the class action question, and because the trial court ruled Section 711.12(2), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional, we granted cert…
Authorities Cited
- Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974)