FRANCES PARDO LOPEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
MANUEL D. LOPEZ, APPELLEE
PER CURIAM.
Having reviewed the lengthy record in this hotly contested case, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s disposition of the matter. However, since it is apparent that the judge declined to grant permanent alimony primarily upon his conclusion that appellant was possessed of valuable property in her own right and since it will likely take appellant substantial time to convert this property into income-producing assets by way of sale or partition, the case is remanded with directions to extend the $50 per week rehabilitative alimony provision for two additional years beyond the one year period set forth in the judgment. In all other respects, the judgment is
Affirmed.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
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Frohman v. Bar-Or, 660 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1995)…d to be applicable to any proceedings after final judgment. Riesgo v. Weinstein, 523 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), disapproved on other grounds, Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Poletz, 652 So. 2d 366 (Fla.1995); Ravel v. Ravel, 326 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). At the very least, if this rule is to be applied after judgments of mortgage foreclosure, the point from which the one year begins to run should not be the mere reservation of jurisdiction. The rule should only be employed to d…1 / 2
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Riesgo v. Ira Weinstein, 523 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…s not subject to a motion to dismiss under Rule 1.420(e) because it proceeds from a reservation of jurisdiction by the trial court to resolve a lien for attorney’s [*754] fees subsequent to the entry of a final judgment. We agree. In Ravel v. Ravel, 326 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), we held that “the rule only requires the dismissal of a case which has not been prosecuted toward final judgment for the requisite period of time. Once final judgment has been entered the rule no longer applies.” Even if we…
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Fin. Sec. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Espana River P'ship, 537 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…st DCA 1986), and Withers v. Flagship Peoples Bank of Tallahassee, 473 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). However, several other cases from the Second District Court of Appeal, Riesgo v. Weinstein, 523 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), and Ravel v. Ravel, 326 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), have held that, once final judgment has been entered, rule 1.420(e) does not apply, the rationale being that a contrary construction would have the practical effect of nullifying an otherwise valid judgment. We do not believe th…
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