FREDDIE HORN, APPELLANT,

v.

MARITIME OVERSEAS CORPORATION, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Rice v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
  …his father’s father, was surnamed, we assume the State has some kind of fairly substantial interest, whether as parens pat-riae or merely to keep account of people, justifying that regulation. If the statute merely enacts custom, see Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), that too should be factually determinable. These appellants contest that the statute requires their son to be named from birth as Austin John Stitt, rather than as Austin John Rice or Rice-Stitt. If the statute does so require,…

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• In re the Petition of Kerry Mack Hooper, 436 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
  …whose children would have a name different from that of their mother. The right of a woman to her birth-given name, notwithstanding marriage, is established under Florida law. See Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Davis v. Boos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). See also Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J.Super. 403, 337 A. 2d 46 (N.J. 1975). Absent injury to the rights of others, there appears to be no reason why a woman’s failure to assert that right upon her marriage should prevent her from doin…
• Smithers v. Smithers, 804 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
  …eneral public. Therefore, a petition under this statute should generally be granted unless sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose. The acquisition of the husband’s surname upon marriage is a common law tradition. As was noted in Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976): It is only by custom, in English speaking countries, that a woman, upon marriage, adopts the surname of her husband in place of the surname of her father. In England, from which came our customs with respect to names, a w…