MARION EUGENE TOUCHTON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Marion Eugene Touchton was convicted of manslaughter for killing another motorist while driving intoxicated. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that blood samples taken from the defendant without protest after his arrest were admissible to prove intoxication and did not violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The court held that blood samples taken from an accused for prosecution purposes after an accusation is made are admissible where the accused submits to or consents to the examination without compulsion. Since Touchton made no claim the blood extraction was against his will, the trial court properly admitted the evidence.
“Evidence resulting from a medical examination of accused for the purposes of the prosecution rather than for treatment, after an accusation has been made against him, is admissible where, in the absence of any compulsion, accused submits or consents to the examination.”
Establishes the legal rule permitting admission of medical evidence when obtained without compulsion
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTouchton was arrested after a collision that killed another motorist, Grover C. Folks. While being treated for injuries at a hospital, a blood sample …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Self-Incrimination cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant was convicted of manslaughter on an information in two counts. The first charged the killing of one Grover C. Folks by driving an automobile onto him while intoxicated. The second count charges culpable negligence resulting' in the killing.
*548He questions the sufficiency of the evidence and also the propriety of taking samples of his blood immediately after his arrest to determine by chemical analysis whether he was intoxicated. - '
A resume of the evidence here would serve no useful purpose unless-it might emphasize the tragic consequences resulting from, the act of those who drink and drive. There is nothing new in this record. It is similar to numerous cases reaching the courts. The driver starts on a trip by auto with loved ones. He begins to drink and drive faster. He collides with another .'motorist and kills the -latter. Although he protests that he’ was not drinking and was driving at a moderate rate of speed, his testimony is refuted on every phase to the satisfaction of the jury and the trial judge. Sentencie was1 passed and an order of insolvency was entered to bring'the judgment here for review. Weh.aye exhmined the evidence in its entirety and find it sufficient to sustain .thq verdict and judgment.
Shortly after the collision the. appellant- was arrested and carried to a hospital for treatment for injuries sustained by him in the collision; While in the hospital a sample j.of- his blood-was taken and a chemical test of it was made;’-The result’of the' blood' test was submitted to' the jury' to -p'rove intoxication. Appellant claims that this was . a. viplatidri of Sec. 12, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, providing “No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ...”
Constitutional inhibitions of this character grew out of the common law right of the accused against self-incrimination. The rule is set forth in C.J.S., Vol. 22, Sec'. 651, Criminal Law that:
“Evidence resulting from a medical examination of accused for the purposes of the prosecution rather than for treatment, after an accusation has been made against him, is admissible where, in the absence of any compulsion, accused submits or consents to the examination.”
' See also Greenleaf on Evidence, 16 ed. Sec. 469e, and Wig-more on Evidence, 3 ed. Sec. 2263.
*549' In the case at bar appellant makes no claim that the blood extracted or the experiment made was against his will. He asserts that no sample of blood was taken from him, hence we are only called upon to approve the rule where the sample' was taken without protest. The trial court did not receive the eyidence until satisfactory evidence was presented by the State that the-samples were taken from.appellant. We hold that the ruling was free of error. See State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 Pac. 2d. 435.
All other questions presented have been considered and we find the judgment proper, hence the same is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BUFORD, C. J., TERRELL, and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.
We adhere to our former judgment of affirmance.
TERRELL, BROWN, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, J., agrees to conclusion reached in the original opinion.
SEBRING, J., concurs in conclusion reached.
BUFORD, C. J., dissents.
dissenting:
I dissent from order adhering to our former judgment of affirmance, because it appears to me:
(a) that the evidence is not sufficient to show that certain blood which was examined by the physician who testified in the cause in regard to same was taken from the defendant.
(b) I entertain the view that the evidence as to the analysis of the blood was not legally admissible in evidence even if it was the blood of the defendant, because it was taken under such circumstances as to preclude its admissibility in that no warning was given defendant that his blood was being taken for the purpose of making an analysis which would be used against him in a criminal prosecution^ See Bethel, et al., v. State, 10 S.W. (2nd) 370; State, v. Horton, 153 S.W. *5501051; State v. Matsinger, 180 S.W. 856; State v. Newcomb, 119 S.W. 405; People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274; People v. Dennis, 226 N.Y.S. 689; Wragg v. Griffin, 170 S.W. 400; People v. Akens, 25 Cal. Ap. 373.
There appear to be some authorities contra, but I think evidence procured by the means adopted in this case should not be admitted, especially when there is room for serious doubt as to the origin of the evidence. In this case the admitting of the evidence may constitute harmless error and, therefore, not be ground for reversal. However, I think it was error and should be so held.
BUFORD, C. J.,
dissenting:
I dissent from order adhering to our former judgment of affirmance, because it appears to me:
(a) that the evidence is not sufficient to show that certain blood which was examined by the physician who testified in the cause in regard to same was taken from the defendant.
(b) I entertain the view that the evidence as to the analysis of the blood was not legally admissible in evidence even if it was the blood of the defendant, because it was taken under such circumstances as to preclude its admissibility in that no warning was given defendant that his blood was being taken for the purpose of making an analysis which would be used against him in a criminal prosecution^ See Bethel, et al., v. State, 10 S.W. (2nd) 370; State, v. Horton, 153 S.W. 1051; State v. Matsinger, 180 S.W. 856; State v. Newcomb, 119 S.W. 405; People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274; People v. Dennis, 226 N.Y.S. 689; Wragg v. Griffin, 170 S.W. 400; People v. Akens, 25 Cal. Ap. 373.
There appear to be some authorities contra, but I think evidence procured by the means adopted in this case should not be admitted, especially when there is room for serious doubt as to the origin of the evidence. In this case the admitting of the evidence may constitute harmless error and, therefore, not be ground for reversal. However, I think it was error and should be so held.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1968)…tly because he hoped it would not indicate an undue amount of intoxication. The circumstances of the instant case were more than ample to satisfy the general rule as to the admissibility of this type of evidence, approved in Touchton v. State, 1944, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752, as against the contention that the defendant’s right to be protected against self-incrimination granted by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., had been violated. This rule was stated in the Touchton…
-
Earnest Leon Jackson v. State, 100 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)…r a treatise on the general subject see 4 U.Fla.L.Rev. 360 (Fall 1951). See also Porter v. State, Fla., 88 So. 2d 924; Hunt v. State, Fla., 87 So. 2d 584; Hopper v. State, Fla., 54 So. 2d 165; Taylor v. State, Fla., 46 So. 2d 725; Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752; Roddenberry v. State, 152 Fla. 197, 11 So. 2d 582, appeal dismissed 317 U.S. 600, 63 S.Ct. 266, 87 L.Ed. 490, rehearing denied 317 U.S. 713, 63 S.Ct. 440, 87 L.Ed. 568; Stephens v. State, 140 Fla. 163, 191 So. 294; Cannon v. State, 9…
-
Odom v. State, 109 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1959)…iolation of the guarantee of Sec. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. and Sec. 918.09, supra, that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself. We think the decision of this court in Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752, is abundant authority for rejecting appellant’s contention. The defendant in the cited case had been convicted of manslaughter by the operation of an automobile while intoxicated. He was hurt in the wreck and was taken to a hospital…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence