MICHAEL ROCHE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1976-02-13
No. 75-374
HOBSON, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
326 So. 2d 448 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1976) Negative Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Michael Roche was convicted of marijuana sale and possession. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction because the trial court erred by admitting testimony about his prior drug transactions, which was probative only of criminal propensity rather than relevant to the charged offense.


Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. Once a defendant objects to evidence of prior misconduct on the ground that it shows only criminal propensity, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the evidence is relevant to a factual issue in the case. The prosecution failed to meet this burden.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible if it solely tends to prove a defendant's bad character or propensity to commit a crime.

[2] When a defendant objects to evidence of prior criminal conduct on the grounds that its sole effect is to prove criminal propensity, the burden shifts to the state to demo…

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Key Quotes

“Such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to any factual issue, unless it tends solely to prove bad character or propensity to commit a crime.”

States the governing rule for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes under Williams v. State.

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Facts & Procedural History

A confidential informant testified that he had purchased marijuana from Roche and that the transaction was recorded via a concealed microphone. During…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of sale and possession of marijuana and timely appeals.

We are presented with two points on ap: peal, only one of which we deem necessary to discuss. It is appellant’s contention that it was error for the trial court to allow into evidence, in the state’s case in chief, testimony as to appellant’s prior criminal conduct over defense counsel’s timely objection. We agree with appellant’s contention and reverse.

At trial a confidential informant testified that he had purchased marijuana from the appellant and that the transaction had been recorded by means of a microphone concealed on his person. During direct examination of the informant, the prosecutor asked the witness if he had ever purchased marijuana from appellant before, and the witness replied, “Yes, I have.” Appellant’s counsel objected on the ground that the state had not laid the proper predicate for this question. The objection was overruled. This testimony presented no information relevant to the issue of appellant’s identity or commission of the offense charged and showed only his propensity to sell marijuana. In Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241, cert. den. Fla.1974, 297 So. 2d 833, this court, in ruling such evidence inadmissible, held:

. Mere similarity of offenses, without regard to the singular manner of their perpetration, is not enough.

The rule governing the admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes is set forth in Williams v. State, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 654; see, also Duncan v. State, supra. Such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to any factual issue, unless it tends solely to prove bad character or propensity to commit a crime. In Franklin v. State, Fla.App.3d, 1969, 229 So. 2d 892, it was held that the burden of showing that the evidence ought to be excluded rests on the defendant. However, once the defendant meets that burden by objection to the proffered evidence on the ground that its sole effect is to prove criminal propensity, the burden then shifts to the state to show that the evidence is relevant to a factual issue in the case. Failure of the prosecution to meet this burden in the Franklin case was ground for reversal. Our supreme court approved this refinement of the Williams rule in State v. Davis, Fla.1974, 290 So. 2d 30.

In the instant case, appellant, w.e submit, met his burden when he objected to the state’s question relating to appellant’s prior misconduct and urged that the state had not laid a predicate for this testimony. No showing was made by the state to indicate that the evidence was relevant to any factual issue in the case.

Accordingly, on the authority of Franklin v. State, supra, the judgment and sentence are hereby reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

HOBSON, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN and SCHEB, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Bush v. State, 341 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
    …ng) committed in the same area and shortly after the crime charged, we hold the evidence met the test of relevance as set forth in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959). See also Wilson v. State, 330 So. 2d 457 (Fla.1976); and Roche v. State, 326 So. 2d 448 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). Affirmed.…
  • Casimiro Garcia v. State, 359 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
    …inadmissible under the holding of Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959). Furthermore, the state failed to demonstrate .that the evidence was relevant to any factual issue in the case. State v. Davis, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla.1974); Roche v. State, 326 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Franklin v. State, 229 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); see Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for a new trial. BOARDM…
  • Griffin v. State, 334 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
    …d [appellant] to quit selling dope.” By dope he said he meant heroin. Our examination of the testimony persuades us that said testimony was relevant only to prove propensity. That being the case it was inadmissible. Roche v. State (Fla.App.2d 1976) 326 So. 2d 448; Duncan v. State (Fla.App.2nd 1974) 291 So. 2d 241. The state contends that even if it was error to admit the officer’s offending testimony it was harmless error. Under the circumstances of this case that contention is unacceptable. Accordingly, t…

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