THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION, APPELLANT,
v.
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LOCAL LODGE NO. 38 AND THE CITY OF NAPLES, FLORIDA, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1976-01-28
No. 75-1035
HOBSON, A. C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
327 So. 2d 43 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Public Employees Relations Commission appealed a circuit court decision that granted the City of Naples jurisdiction to determine whether paying wage increases to police officers during a pending union certification petition would constitute an unfair labor practice. The court reversed, holding that PERC has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice determinations under Florida's Tucker Act.


Holding

The circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the case because PERC has exclusive jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practice questions. Although the Tucker Act vests certain authority in the circuit court regarding public employees labor matters, it does not grant jurisdiction to determine whether particular activities constitute unfair labor practices.


Headnotes

[1] A circuit court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether an action constitutes an unfair labor practice when that determination is vested exclusively in an administrative…

[2] The Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) has exclusive jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practices concerning public employees under Florida law.

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Key Quotes

“Even though the City is seeking a declaration with respect to action which has not yet been taken, the making of such a determination would be equivalent to passing on the question of whether the particular activity constituted an unfair labor practice.”

Establishes that the court will not allow circuit courts to issue advisory declarations on matters that amount to unfair labor practice determinations

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Facts & Procedural History

The City of Naples sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court regarding whether it would be an unfair labor practice to grant pay raises to …

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Judge.

GRIMES, Judge.

One of the issues in this interlocutory appeal has been determined in Public Employees Relations Commission v. City of Naples, Florida, Fla.App.2d 1975, 327 So. 2d 41 (1976), in which this court held that the City of Naples could not assume jurisdiction over public employees bargaining matters pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 447.603 (1974) until the provisions and procedures of its ordinance were approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC).

The other issue in this case is whether the City is entitled to a circuit court determination of whether it would be an unfair labor practice to give a pay raise to the Naples Police Department at a time when there is pending before PERC a petition for certification filed on behalf of certain members of that department. We hold that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear this issue.

Even though the City is seeking a declaration with respect to action which has not yet been taken, the making of such a determination would be equivalent to passing on the question of whether the particular activity constituted an unfair labor practice.1 Fla.Stat. § 447.503 (1974) vests PERC with jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practices. PERC’s orders are subject to review in the appropriate district court of appeal. While the Tucker Act (Chapter 447, Part II) does vest authority in the circuit court to determine certain issues concerning public employees labor matters,2 there is nothing in the Act which would give the circuit court jurisdiction to consider the question which the City wishes to have answered. On the federal level, it has been held that the courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to determine matters which are arguably within the scope of the unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.3 The justification for pre-empting to the NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices was more recently discussed in Amalgamated Ass’n of St. Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 1971, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473, where the U.S. Supreme Court said:

“The rationale for pre-emption, then, rests in large measure upon our determination that when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply to alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system. Thus, that á local court, while adjudicating a labor dispute also within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, may purport to apply legal rules identical to those prescribed in the federal Act or may eschew the authority to define or apply principles specifically developed to regulate labor relations does not mean that all relevant potential for debilitating conflict is absent.”

While the Tucker Act differs from the National Labor Relations Act in many particulars, the philosophy expressed by those provisions relating to administrative jurisdiction over unfair labor practices seems to be the same. It appears to us that the legislature intended for PERC to have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice questions of the type posed by the City in this case.4

The order on appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions that the complaint and the counterclaim be dismissed.

HOBSON, A. C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . Coincidentally, the Fraternal Order of Police has pending before PERC an unfair labor practice charge against the City predicated upon the withholding of wage increases from police department personnel.

. E. g., Fla.Stat. §§ 447.607 and 447.509 (1974).

. E. g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 1959, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.

. Obviously, at such time as the City’s local option ordinance is approved by PERC, jurisdiction over unfair labor practices will then fall under the comparable public employees relations commission established by the ordinance.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …e that the Act gives PERC exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving activities which are arguably unfair labor practices, citing as support for that proposition the decision of this court in Public Emp. Rel Com’n v. Fraternal Ord. of Pol., etc., 327 So. 2d 43 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), and the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Maxwell v. School Board of Broward County, 330 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In Public Emp. Rel. Com’n v. Fraternal Ord. of Pol., supra, this court held that a circuit…
  • Warden v. Bennett, 340 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
    …e, it was necessary for Warden to first exhaust her administrative remedies before the Public Employees Relations Commission under Chapter 447. Our court held in Public Employees Relations Commission v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local Lodge No. 38, 327 So. 2d 43 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), that the federal doctrine of preemption is applicable to the activities of public employers in Florida who commit acts which are arguably unfair labor practices. But with all due respect, we cannot see how [*979] the furnishing of…
  • …). Accordingly, while the Commission was estopped from rehearing the issue of Ott’s insubordination, it had jurisdiction to determine whether the City had committed an unfair labor practice. See PERC v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local Lodge No. 38, 327 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). We now turn to the more critical issue of whether there was substantial competent evidence to support PERC’s finding that the City was motivated by anti-union sentiment in firing Ott. To be sustained, the finding of PERC, like t…

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