LOUIS H. BROWN, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF NANCY VIRGINIA BROWN,
v.
SCOTT M. LOFTIN, AND JOHN W. MARTIN, AS TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION
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In this railway accident case, the administrator of Nancy Virginia Brown's estate appealed a summary judgment dismissal of a wrongful death claim arising from a collision between an automobile and a moving freight train at an unguarded street crossing in Fort Lauderdale. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that automobile drivers have a duty to exercise greater care at railroad crossings and cannot rely solely on absent warning devices.
The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the alleged distinguishing factors were legally insufficient to overcome the established rule that drivers have a duty to exercise care at railroad crossings. The moving nature of the train versus a standing train does not alter the analysis, and the absence of warning devices cannot excuse a driver's failure to observe a 32-car freight train directly in the roadway.
“If a driver of an automobile fails or omits, when approaching a railroad crossing, to see or observe a moving freight train on a railroad crossing directly in front of the driver of the car and across the highway he is traveling, when the freight train consists of thirty or more cars, then a serious doubt arises and must exist as to whether or not lawfully required signs and signals at such crossing would prove efficacious.”
Establishes that the driver's failure to observe a large moving train is the critical factor, not the absence of warning devices.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 26, 1943, at approximately 1:00 A.M., a vehicle carrying six people (driven by a Navy Chief Petty Officer) struck the 17th car of a movin…
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This is a railway accident case in which Miss Nancy Virginia Brown lost her life. She, with three others occupied the rear seat of the automobile which ran into a freight train consisting of 32 cars then operated by the Florida East Coast Railway Company over a regular street crossing situated on the outskirts of the City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The collision occurred around 1:00 o’clock A.M., September 26, 1943. The freight train was in motion and the automobile struck the 17th car back from the engine. The automobile was driven by a Chief "Petty Officer of the United States Navy. The party consisted of three Lieutenants and three young lady guests — having previously attended an officers’ párty — at the Naval Air Base and were then returning to the City of Fort Lauderdale.
The trial court Held that the declaration failed to state a cause of action and bottomed his conclusions on cases viz: Kimball v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. 132 Fla. 235, 181 So. 533; Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628; Denton v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 141 Fla. 153, 192 So. 624; Clark v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 141 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621, and similar cases. Counsel for plaintiff below perfected an appeal here.
It is contended here that the case at bar is distinguishable from the cited cases for reasons viz: (1) the cited cases involved a standing train, while the case here was a moving train; (2) the dangerous aspects of the crossing was made known to the railroad company a year prior to the collision; (3) warning signals had not been constructed at the' crossing; (4) a signboard or other warning devises were totally *623absent where the collision occurred; (5) the collision occurred on a much traveled street within the municipality; (6) absence of automobile flash signals at the crossing; (7) dimout regulation controlling lights on automobiles; (8) automobile was operated at reasonable speed but occupants were unable to see the moving freight train; (9) other substantial reasons are assigned, constituting questions of fact submittable to a jury under appropriate instructions.
The contention that the freight train was in motion when the accident occurred rather than at a stop cannot affect our previous holdings, because in either instance the train was being operated within the meaning of the statute. The absence of .sign boards, flash light signals and other warning devices about the railroad crossing are insufficient reasons under the peculiar circumstances of this controversy. If a driver of an automobile fails or omits, when approaching a railroad crossing, to see or. observe a moving freight train on a railroad crossing directly in front of the driver of the car and across the highway he is traveling, when the freight train consists of thirty or more cars, then a serious doubt arises and must exist as to whether or not lawfully required signs and signals at such crossing would prove efficacious.
It is contended that the painting of the lights of the automobile except a narrow strip, in accordance with the dimout regulations, prevented the driver from seeing the freight train then on the crossing. The answer to this contention is that greater care and caution should have been exercised by the driver at or near the crossing because of his inefficient lights. We are unable to appreciate the contention that the plaintiff below has been deprived of due process in not being allowed to submit to a jury the alleged disputes and conflicts, likely to develop, under the allegations of the declaration.
It is our conclusion that the reasons offered here to distinguish the facts in the case at bar from the Kimball case, and similar suits are legally insufficient.
Affirmed.
BUFORD, C. J., TERRELL, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
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Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 56 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951)…So. 533; Woods v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 100 Fla. 909, 130 So. 601; Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628; Denton v. Atlantic & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 141 Fla. 153, 192 So. 624; Powell v. Gary, 146 Fla. 334, 200 So. 854; Brown v. Loftin, 154 Fla. 621, 18 So. 2d 540, and similar cases. It is suggested that this Court could rest its ruling of affirmance exclusively on the Kimball case, supra. Counsel for plaintiff-appellant point out that our holding in the Kimball case, and similar adjudications…
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Goff v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 53 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1951)…nces show, as a matter of law, that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was the negligence of the driver of the automobile, under what the defendant calls the "standing train doctrine" and the decisions of this court in Brown v. Loftin, 154 Fla. 621, 18 So. 2d 540, 541, and the cases therein cited. We held in Brown v. Loftin that the absence of warning signals at a crossing did not render the railroad company liable for damages resulting from a crossing accident in which an automobile ran into…
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Massey v. Seaboard AIR Line R.R. Co., 132 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)…l Automotive, Inc. Subsequently, the Railroad moved for a summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings and various affidavits and depositions. The lower court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the case of Brown v. Loftin, 1944, 154 Fla. 621, 18 So. 2d 540, controlled. The amended complaint alleged that Clinton Avenue was a blacktop macadam road which does not reflect light and that the Railroad’s warning signs were inadequate. In addition, it was alleged that the weather was dark and…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kimball v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 132 Fla. 235 (Fla. 1938)
- Ada C. Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119 (Fla. 1939)
- City of S. Miami v. State ex rel. Cary D. Landis, 140 Fla. 740 (Fla. 1939)
- Clark v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 141 Fla. 155 (Fla. 1939)
- Denton v. Atl. & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 141 Fla. 153 (Fla. 1939)
- City of S. Miami v. State ex rel. Cary D. Landis, 140 Fla. 747 (Fla. 1939)