SAMUEL CURRY SNEDAKER, APPELLANT,
v.
KAREN RAMEY SNEDAKER, APPELLEE
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In this child custody appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of custody to the mother, finding that the trial judge abused his discretion by awarding custody without evidentiary support and contrary to the child's best interests, which the evidence clearly showed would be better served with the father.
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody to the mother. Although a mother of a child of tender years ordinarily receives prime consideration in custody proceedings, this presumption is overcome when the evidence demonstrates that the child's best interests and welfare will be better served with the father. Custody is reversed and remanded with directions to award custody to the father.
[1] A trial court's final judgment in child custody proceedings must be supported by evidence adduced before the court.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion in child custody matters when its judgment lacks a foundation in the evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is settled law that although a trial court has broad discretion in child custody proceedings, nevertheless his final judgment must have a foundation in the evidence adduced before him.”
Establishes that while trial courts have discretion in custody matters, such discretion must be supported by evidence in the record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involves a dispute over custody of a three-year-old minor child between the parties. The trial court awarded custody to the mother (appellee)…
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BOYER, Chief Judge.
This appeal emanates from a final judgment entered by the learned trial judge awarding to the appellee (mother) custody of the three-year-old minor child of the parties. The facts are such that no useful purpose will be accomplished by a lengthy recitation thereof. Suffice to say that our reading of the record reveals no evidence in support of appellee’s contention that it is for the “best interest” of the minor child for custody to be awarded to her. It is settled law that although a trial court has broad discretion in child custody proceedings, nevertheless his final judgment must have a foundation in the evidence adduced before him. Sub judice the record reveals that the evidence did not afford a basis for the able trial judge’s conclusion when considered in the light of the principles announced in the cases hereinafter cited. We find therefore, in the absence of such evidence, that the learned judge abused his discretion. (Dinkel v. Dinkel, Sup.Ct.Fla.1975, 322 So. 2d 22, opinion filed August 14, 1975)
As opposed to the void of evidence in support of the position of appellee, the record is replete with evidence that the best interest of the child will be accomplished by awarding custody to the child’s father, appellant here.
In any child custody proceeding, the welfare of the child is the prime consideration. (Brust v. Brust, Fla.App. 1st 1972, 266 So. 2d 400, certiorari denied Sup. Ct.Fla.1972, 271 So. 2d 142; Dinkel v. Dinkel, supra, and cases therein cited)
Other things being equal, prime consideration should be given to the mother of a child of tender years in custody proceedings. (Brust v. Brust, supra; Dinkel v. Dinkel, supra)
However, when the evidence reveals that “other things” are not equal then the primary consideration accorded the mother is subservient to the best interests and welfare of the child.
There is a clear distinction between fitness of parents and the best interests of a child. Both parents may be fit but “other factors” may determine with which of the fit parents a child’s interests and welfare will be best served.
When, as here, there is a dearth of evidence in support of the position of the mother, as opposed to overwhelming evidence indicating that it is for the best interests of the child for its custody to be awarded to its father, any “presumption”, “prime consideration”, or “natural edge”, abiding with the mother is overcome and custody should be awarded to that parent in whose custody the best interests of the child will be served, in the light of the evidence adduced.
Accordingly, that portion of the final judgment here appealed by which custody of the parties’ minor child was awarded to appellee is reversed and this cause is remanded with directions that said child’s custody be awarded to appellant, Samuel Curry Snedaker. It is so ordered.
MILLS, J., concurs.
SACK, MARTIN, Associate Judge, dissents. .
SACK, MARTIN, Associate Judge
(dissenting) .
I dissent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Marshall v. Allyson M. Marshall, 375 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…ent testimony, including that of the home study worker, who recommended custody be given to the father, supports the father’s claim. No factor other than the tender age of the child appears in the mother’s favor. This court in Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) states the rule on proper application of the tender years doctrine, in part as follows: “Other things being equal, prime consideration should be given to the mother of a child of tender years in custody proceedings. . However,…
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Burns v. Snedaker, 348 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…PER CURIAM. The marriage of the parties was dissolved by final judgment by which custody of the child of the marriage was awarded to the mother, but that aspect of the final judgment was reversed by this court. See Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The child’s mother, appellant sub judice, thereafter remarried and petitioned for modification and award of custody, alleging a change in circumstances. The trial judge denied the petition and awarded the husband, appellee here,…
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Bregman v. Bregman, 388 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…have sustained the awarding of children of tender years to the father. Anderson v. Anderson, supra; Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Ross v. Ross, supra; Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Keller v. Keller, 348 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1977). As to the point on the personal property, the husband made a claim for it in his original pleading; he tendered a list identifying it without any objection, and we find that the app…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Vamper v. Hill Bros., Inc., 271 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1972)
- Bass v. State, 271 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1972)