R. HENRY BALDWIN,
v.
MERCEDES FOSTER BALDWIN
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In this divorce-related appeal, the Florida Supreme Court upheld an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff Mercedes Foster Baldwin for legal services rendered prior to reconciliation between the parties, despite the subsequent reconciliation making the divorce moot.
The court affirmed the award of attorneys' fees. The court held that fees for services rendered prior to reconciliation may be enforced even after reconciliation occurs, as the right to those fees had been adjudicated before the reconciliation took place.
“As hereinbefore stated the chancellor had before the occurrence of the reconciliation, determined that the plaintiff was entitled to receive from defendant temporary alimony and fees for her solicitors.”
Establishes that the right to attorneys' fees was adjudicated before reconciliation, making reconciliation irrelevant to the enforceability of the fee award
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePrior to any reconciliation, the court had already adjudicated that the plaintiff's wife was entitled to a decree for temporary alimony and attorneys'…
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The appeal brings for review an order allowing attorneys’ fees which was entered in a proceeding for divorce but after reconciliation between the parties. The record shows that prior to the entry of the decree complained of the Court had adjudicated that the plaintiff’s wife was entitled to decree for temporary alimony and attorneys’ fees.
After reconciliation was affected between the parties attorneys for plaintiff petitioned for an allowance of attorneys’ fees for services rendered prior to reconciliation and in support of same presented affidavits of counsel. Appellant moved to dismiss the petition setting up the fact of reconciliation between the parties. The Court denied the motion to dismiss the petition and referred the same to a Master to take testimony and make and report findings. On report of testimony taken the master’s report says:
“Based on the record in this case and the testimony taken before me, I find that a reasonable fee to be allowed to the plaintiff Mercedes Foster Baldwin, for the services rendered by her attorneys is the sum of seven hundred and fifty ($750.) dollars and recommended the same to the Court as a reasonable fee to be allowed said plaintiff.”
Appellant filed exceptions. to master’s report and motion to strike affidavits in support of claim for attorneys’ fees.
On final hearing the chancellor entered his order, saying: “This cause came on to be heard upon the petition for the *625allowance of solicitors’ fees, the evidence submitted before the special master on said petition and the report and findings of the said special master, the exceptions to the special master’s report filed by counsel for each party, and upon the motion to strike certain affidavits from the record, said motion filed before me at said hearing. After argument of counsel for the respective parties herein, and the Court being fully advised of its judgment to be entered in the premises, thereupon,”
“It Is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows:
“1. The motion to strike be and the same is hereby denied, the special master having announced at the hearing before him that he did not consider the said affidavits.
“2. That the exceptions filed to the special master’s report be and each of them are hereby denied.
“3. That the defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay into the registry of the court within five days from receipt of a copy of this order by his attorney, for the use and benefit of the solicitors of record for the plaintiff the sum of $750.00 which the Court finds as a reasonable fee for the services rendered to the plaintiff by said solicitors in said cause.”
■ As hereinbefore stated the chancellor had before the occurrence of the reconciliation, determined that the plaintiff was entitled to receive from defendant temporary alimony and fees for her solicitors.
The fees here involved were based upon services rendered in the proceedings prior to reconciliation.
In this connection see Bell v. Bell, 214 Ala. 573, 108 So. 375; Kiddle v. Kiddle, 90 Neb. 248, 133 N. W. 181.
We find no reversible error reflected by the record and the decree is affirmed.
So ordered.
TERRELL, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Knott v. Knott, 395 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…f an affidavit or live testimony or whatever. Where the parties to a divorce action become reconciled, the cause may be dismissed as to the divorce action and permitted to continue for allowance of attorneys’ fees. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 154 Fla. 624, 18 So. 2d 681 (1944); Turnipseed v. Turnipseed, 158 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); Hadlock v. Hadlock, 137 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). The trial court’s determination that the husband pay half the wife’s reasonable attorneys’ fees was the result of an offer…
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Hadlock v. Hadlock, 137 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…cament ought to be compensated for the services rendered, and that the wife should be allowed suit money for that purpose,’ * * * ” Our question has been answered in Florida in the affirmative. We have examined the file in Baldwin v. Baldwin, 1944, 154 Fla. 624, 18 So. 2d 681. In that case there was a complaint by the wife and an answer and counterclaim by the husband. The court entered an order for temporary attorney’s fees and costs. Then a stipulation was filed in the cause by the parties reciting that…
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Irwin v. Honorable Paul M. Marko, III, 408 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ived the dismissal of the action between the parties. . . . Where the parties to a divorce action become reconciled, the cause may be dismissed as to the divorce action and permitted to continue for allowance of attorneys’ fees. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 154 Fla. 624, 18 So. 2d 681 (1944); Turnipseed v. Turnipseed, 158 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); Hadlock v. Hadlock, 137 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). at p. 1198. Under the Knoti rationale, the trial court here should have allowed the attorneys to continue li…
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