PENELOPE GAY SHEPPARD, APPELLANT,

v.

RAMADA INN, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
  …II in connection with petitioner’s availing himself of the opportunity to engage in plea negotiations. The state makes a further argument of lack of continuous availability based on the defendant’s absence on the 180th day, citing State v. Exposito, 327 So. 2d 836 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). There, after declaration of a mistrial, a new trial was scheduled. When the appointed time arrived, the defendant and his counsel did not appear. Counsel for a codefendant informed the court that counsel for defendant was “down th…
• State v. Waldo Toyos, 448 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
  …ion for continuance operates as waiver of speedy trial where counsel is aware of co-defendant’s motion, participates in subsequent discovery, and takes no affirmative action to inform the trial court of his desire to go to trial); State v. Exposito, 327 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (where counsel for defendant is “down the hall” when case is called for trial, defendant is not continuously available for trial); State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (speedy trial waived where defendant’s attorney…
• State v. Kubesh, 378 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
  …t occurred on January 5 speedy trial was waived. There is no doubt that it was waived as to Gopsill because neither he nor his attorney appeared before the court on that date. Thus, they were not ready and available for trial. See State v. Exposito, 327 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), and Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(e). We also conclude that Kubesh’s attorney waived speedy trial. To begin with, his comments at the hearing on January 5 indicate that he was not prepared for trial, but that he and Gopsill’s attorney wer…

Authorities Cited

• In re Est. OF Max Lieber, 103 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1958)