CRANE ET AL.
v.
LOFTIN ET AL.
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Plaintiff Crane appealed the dismissal of her complaint seeking damages for emotional distress caused by a near-collision with a railroad locomotive. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff's allegations of excessive speed were insufficient to constitute willful and wanton negligence required for recovery of damages for mental anguish without direct physical impact.
The court held that the plaintiff failed to allege a case for recovery based upon willful and wanton negligence. The mere allegation of excessive speed is insufficient as a relative term, as the same speed may be reckless in some circumstances but not in others, and excessive speed alone has been found insufficient to establish gross negligence or willful, wanton, or malicious conduct.
“It has been recognized in this jurisdiction that where the facts giving rise to an action in tort for personal injuries are such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care or attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages, recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected with direct physical impact or trauma may be authorized.”
Establishes the legal standard for recovery of emotional damages without physical injury in Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLillian Crane was lawfully driving her husband's automobile across railroad tracks in Miami when a locomotive operated by the defendant was propelled …
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SEBRING, Justice.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff below from a final order dismissing a complaint in a common-law action wherein the plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from fright and mental, anguish unaccompanied by direct .physical impact or trauma.
The complaint alleged in substance that the plaintiff, Lillian Crane, was lawfully driving the automobile owned by her husband along a heavily traveled street in Miami, Florida; that as she drove upon and was crossing the railroad tracks of the defendant which passed over said street, “a locomotive and train of cars being operated and controlled by /the defendant * * * at an excessive speed, was propelled and run into * * * the said automobile * * * thus causing said plaintiff to leap and flee from said automobile, in order to avoid being struck by said locomotive and train of cars * * * that because of the excessive speed at which the defendant * * * operated and ran its locomotive and train of cars causing the injuries * *• * the defendants * * were guilty of wanton and wilful carelessness and neglect in the premises in this, to wit: that the defendant * * * knew or should have known of the inherent danger arising out of running its locomotive and train of cars at an excessive speed through a largely populated city and across a heavily traveled highway.”
It has been recognized in this jurisdiction that where the facts giving rise to an action in tort for personal injuries are such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care or attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages, recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected with direct physical impact or trauma may be authorized. Kirksey v. Jernigan, Fla., 45 So. 2d 188.
The primary question on this appeal is whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to bring the plaintiff within the principle stated.
The gist of the negligence alleged in the complaint is that, the locomotive and train of cars of the defendant were being operated at an excéssive speed along a railroad track that crossed a heavily traveled highway in a largely populated city. The issue is whether these allegations are sufficient to reasonably imply malice, or entire want of care or attention to duty, or such great indifference to the rights of others as to impute malice.
In Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A.L.R. 886, it is held that the mere allegation that one was traveling at a high rate of speed is nothing more than the use of a relative terni, because a given speed might be reckless in some circumstances and yet not in others. Excessive speed in other instances has been found to be an insufficient basis for á charge of gross negligence or willful, wanton or ma licious conduct. DeWald v. Quarnstrom, Fla., 60 So. 2d 919; Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So. 2d 870; O’Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817; Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588, 195 So. 399.
We have the view that under the controlling law as to the right of a plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from fright and mental anguish, unaccompanied by direct physical impact or. trauma, the plaintiff has failed to allege a case for recovery based upon willful and wanton negligence of the defendant.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
It .is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
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Griffith v. Shamrock Vill., Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957)…erty or rights of others. This is consistent with the theory that punitive damages are allowed as a deterrent to commission by others of similar offenses. The holding in the Kirksey case was recognized in the later case of Crane v. Loftin, Fla.1954, 70 So. 2d 574. Since the trial judge allowed the claim-for punitive damages to remain in the complaint until after all evidence had been submitted at the trial, it seems to us that he reasoned as we have here that punitive damages can be recovered in actions suc…
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Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974)…nt of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages.” 45 So. 2d 188, 189. In the case of Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla.1954), the Court was concerned with a plaintiff who sought damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted [*600] from fright and mental anguish unaccompanied by direct physical impact. In this case, the plaintiff had to flee from her au…1 / 2
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Zell v. Gaylynn Sue Meek and Barry M. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1995)…at some physical impact to a claimant must be alleged and demonstrated before the claimant could recover damages for personal injury. This rule is referred to as “the impact rule.” Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla.1974); Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla.1954).1 GILLIAM v. STEWART The impact rule has not been without its critics and has been abolished in most jurisdictions.2 In 1972, the Fourth District, believing that the impact rule was “at variance with modern-day needs and with conce…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950)
- Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378 (Fla. 1946)
- Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779 (Fla. 1940)
- Winthrop v. Carinhas, 142 Fla. 588 (Fla. 1940)
- O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770 (Fla. 1940)
- De Wald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1952)