FLOYD PEARCE
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Floyd Pearce appeals his second-degree murder conviction for killing a man at his jook (informal bar/establishment). The Florida Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to support murder but sufficient for manslaughter, as the deceased was a trespasser killed in hot blood and heat of passion.
The evidence was insufficient to support a second-degree murder conviction. The court modified the judgment to manslaughter, finding that while the deceased was a trespasser killed in hot blood and heat of passion, the jury properly rejected the self-defense claim because the fight had subsided and there was no present danger to life or limb at the time of the killing.
“The law is that whoever kills in hot blood and heat of passion, a trespasser, shall be guilty of manslaughter.”
Establishes the legal standard that killing a trespasser in the heat of passion constitutes manslaughter, not murder.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe killing occurred at appellant's jook when a man entered the premises, went into the private living quarters, took a shotgun from the manager (appe…
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The appellant appeals from a conviction of second degree murder. The record before us presents only one question which requires discussion and that is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
The place of the killing was at appellant’s jook. The strongest version of the evidence against appellant disclosed that at the time of the killing he had responded to a second call within about two hours, to restore order. When he reached the place deceased was at the door armed with a shotgun and conducting himself in a threatening and hostile manner. Deceased had taken the shotgun from appellant’s son, who was the manager of the jook, and chased him away. *657The defense interposed was self-defense which was rejected by the jury and we find no reason to say they erred. Appellant insists that it was necessary for him to protect his son and employees from impending death or great bodily harm at the time of the killing. We think the jury was warranted in concluding that the fight in the place had subsided and there was no present reason to suppose there was danger to life or limb.
The deceased entered the place which was public and entered the private living quarters of appellant’s son and while there took a shotgun, belonging to the son, from him. When appellant arrived deceased was in possession of the gun, standing in the back entrance not used generally by the public, and sought to bar appellant’s entry in an abusive and threatening manner. When deceased went beyond that part of the premises which was frequented by the public and into the living quarters of the operator he became a trespasser. The law is that whoever kills in hot blood and heat of passion, a trespasser, shall be guilty of manslaughter. Wharton’s Criminal Law, 12d, Sec. 595.
Viewing the voluminous testimony in the record we conclude that the evidence here makes a case of manslaughter and not murder in the second decree. Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Act, the judgment is modified .with directions to adjudge appellant guilty of manslaughter and sentence him accordingly.
When such modified judgment is entered it will stand affirmed.
So ordered.
BUFORD, C. J„ BROWN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Febre v. State, 158 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1947)…quate provocation. 40 C. J. S. 907, 46-a F.S.A., 782.03. The evidence establishes guilt of the defendant on a charge of manslaughter, but not murder in the first degree. F.S.A. 920.06; Douglas v. State, 152 Fla. 63, 10 So. (2) 731; Pearce v. State, 154 Fla. 656, 18 So. (2) 754. Therefore, the judgment is modified, with directions to adjudge the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and sentence him as may be appropriate. It is so ordered. THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.…
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Roberts v. State, 425 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…sive force in the face of the decedent’s threatening actions, and thus he was guilty of no more than manslaughter. The crime of manslaughter encompasses those situations in which the defendant uses excessive force to defend himself. Pearce v. State, 154 Fla. 656, 18 So. 2d 754 (1944); Pierce v. State, 376 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Martinez v. State, 360 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict of second degree murder. The…