MELVYN B. FRUMKES, APPELLANT,
v.
NANCY J. FRUMKES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a marriage dissolution case, the trial court awarded the wife's former attorney $900 in fees by order entered several months after the final judgment became final. The husband-appellant, an attorney, appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to award the fee. The appellate court agreed, holding that while a court retains power to modify enforcement of a final judgment, it lacks power to amend or alter the judgment's provisions after the rehearing period expires unless authorized by statute or rule.
No. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to award the attorney's fees. While a court retains power to modify the time and manner of enforcement of a final judgment after it becomes final, it does not retain power to amend, modify, or alter the provisions of a final judgment unless provided by statute or rule. The reservation clause in the final judgment did not reserve jurisdiction to award attorney's fees.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter the provisions of a final judgment after the time for filing a petition for rehearing has passed, unless a sta…
[2] A general reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment to effectuate its terms does not retain jurisdiction to award attorneys fees if such jurisdiction would otherwis…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court retains the power to modify by subsequent order the time and manner of the enforcement of a final judgment after it becomes final, but it does not retain the power, unless provided by statute or rule, to amend, modify or alter the provisions of a final judgment.”
Establishes the fundamental distinction between modifying enforcement versus amending the substance of a judgment, which is the core legal principle underlying the court's decision.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife's former attorney moved to withdraw from a marriage dissolution case on June 27, 1974. The trial court ordered that the question of attorney'…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PER CURIAM.
Melvyn B. Frumkes, the husband in a marriage dissolution, appeals from an order awarding $900 to his wife’s former attorney.
On June 27, 1974, pursuant to motion by the wife’s former attorney, the trial court entered an order permitting him to withdraw from the case and further ordered “that the question of attorneys fees shall be continued for a subsequent hearing at which time testimony may be taken therefor,” and that the final hearing would be held at 9:00 A.M., on August 16, 1974.
The wife retained new counsel; the final hearing was held and final judgment entered on August 16, 1974. Former counsel received notice of the final hearing but did not appear thereat. The final judgment by its terms retained “jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter for the effectuation of the terms of this final judgment.” On September 10, 1974, the wife’s former attorney noticed the husband, Melvyn Frumkes, of a hearing for his attorneys fees pursuant to the order of June 27, 1974, which notice of hearing was beyond the time for filing a petition for rehearing on the final judgment. On December 17, 1974, the trial judge entered an order awarding the former attorney a reasonable fee for his services on behalf of the wife. From the record, it appears that the husband, who is an attorney, and the former attorney, had indicated to the court prior to the entry of the final judgment, that the former attorney was entitled to a fee for his services and on that basis the judge entered the order awarding the attorneys fee. The husband now appeals, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction to award an attorneys fee. We reluctantly must agree.
The court retains the power to modify by subsequent order the time and manner of the enforcement of a final judgment after it becomes final, but it does not retain the power, unless provided by statute or rule, to amend, modify or alter the provisions of a final judgment. McEachin v. McEachin, Fla.App.1963, 154 So. 2d 894. The reservation clause in the final judgment involved in this appeal, did not have the effect of reserving or retaining the judge’s jurisdiction to award attorneys fees and grant to it jurisdiction that otherwise is lost after the time for filing a petition for rehearing had passed. Therefore, the order awarding attorneys fees is reversed.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (38 total)
-
Finkelstein v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986)…s fees merely because the final judgment did not contain the magic words “jurisdiction is reserved.” Defendants cite Oyer v. Boyer, 383 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); McCollum v. McCollum, 364 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); and Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), to support their contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees because the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees was filed three days after the time for appeal had expired. However, a significant d…
-
Bailey v. Bailey, 392 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…fter final judgment in the absence of a reservation of jurisdiction. Oyer v. Boyer, 383 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); McCallum v. McCallum, 364 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Church v. Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The issue of whether the trial court has reserved jurisdiction is totally separate from the issue of whether, having reserved it, its jurisdiction is divested by a pending appeal. . This lack of jurisdiction in a trial court to…
-
B & L Motors, Inc. v. Bignotti, 427 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…judgment and subject to execution as the law allows. [*1072] Appellant argues that a reservation of jurisdiction is invalid unless made in the final judgment itself, citing Church v. Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), and Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). While those dissolution of marriage cases and others cited by appellant do require that a court reserve jurisdiction to make later awards of attorney’s fees, they do not hold that the reservation must be made in the final judgmen…
Previewing 3 of 38 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McEACHIN v. Dalton H. McEACHIN, 154 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)