RANDY L. HERDMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1976-03-12
No. 74-1716
CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.
328 So. 2d 459 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

Opinion of the Court
OWEN, Judge.

OWEN, Judge.

Appellant was charged by information with obtaining property by means of a worthless check, proscribed by Fla.Stat. § 832.05(3) (1973). Convicted on his own guilty plea, he now contends that the information wholly failed to charge a criminal offense in that it did not specifically allege an intent to defraud. His reliance upon the case of Anderson v. Bryson, 94 Fla. 1165, 115 So. 505 (1927), is mispláced as the statute has been amended subsequent to that decision. In Ennis v. State, 95 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1957), cert. den., 355 U.S. 868, 78 S.Ct. 117, 2 L.Ed.2d 74 (1957), which does not at all hold what United States v. Frazier, 444 F. 2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), said it did, an information substantially identical to the one in the case at bar, in which there was no allegation of an intent to defraud, was held to contain every essential element required by the statute.

AFFIRMED.

CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur.


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  • Prince v. State, 333 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
    …because there was no allegation in either count that she uttered or delivered the said checks with the intent to defraud. This question was laid to rest, contrary to appellant’s position, by the opinion of this Court in Herdman v. State of Florida, 328 So. 2d 459, filed March 12, 1976. The Defendant next urges reversal because the standard jury instruction given by the Court did not charge the jury upon the basic proposition relating to the indispensable element of intend to defraud. With this thrust, the De…

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