PETER B. ATWOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
MELVIN A. FISHER ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1976-03-23
No. 75-782
Before BARKDULL, C. J„ and HEN-DRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
330 So. 2d 62 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

An attorney sought to recover a $25,000 loan to treasure hunters, claiming the collateral (gold bars and coins) were fraudulent. The trial court dismissed the complaint as usurious under Florida law because the loan agreement required payment of a gold doubloon worth at least $1,000 in exchange for a 30-day loan, constituting an unlawful interest rate of 48% annually.


Holding

The court affirmed dismissal, holding that the loan agreement is usurious on its face because it expressly provides for a loan in exchange for consideration (the gold doubloon) that exceeds the legal interest rate. As an attorney and preparer of the agreement, Atwood knew or should have known it was usurious, and under Florida Statutes Chapter 687, he forfeited both principal and interest.


Headnotes

[1] A loan agreement is usurious on its face if it expressly provides for interest exceeding the legal rate at the time of execution.

[2] The intent to charge excessive interest for a loan is sufficiently proven if the lender knew or should have known the agreement was usurious.

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Key Quotes

“There must exist an intent on the part of the lender at the time the loan agreement is executed to get more than the legal interest and if the agreement is usurious at that time no subsequent transaction will purge it.”

Establishes the legal standard for usury—intent at execution time cannot be cured by later events.

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Facts & Procedural History

Attorney Peter Atwood loaned $25,000 to defendants for 30 days on January 3, 1973, in exchange for receiving a gold doubloon valued at not less than $…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Peter B. Atwood, Esq., seeks reversal of an order dismissing with prejudice his second amended complaint for recovery of a $25,000 loan.

Peter Atwood, an attorney, agreed to loan the defendants, who are treasure hunters, $25,000 for 30 days and on January 3, 1973 he drew up the loan agreement providing that in exchange for lending defendants $25,000 for a period of 30 days, he would be entitled to receive a gold doubloon (value not less than $1,000). In addition, defendants were required to deposit with him as security for the loan, three gold bars (supposedly minted in Mexico in 1659) worth $7,000 each. The agreement was signed by both parties and Atwood tendered a $25,000 check to defendants, who in turn deposited the three gold bars. Defendants did not repay the loan and in June 1973 they left a second gold coin (supposedly of numismatic value of not less than $1,000) with Atwood to delay enforcement of the $25,000 debt. The defendants failed to repay the loan and plaintiff in August 1973 filed a complaint and eventually a second amended complaint for return of his $25,000. He alleged therein that the gold bars and coins were fakes and demanded punitive damages for fraud. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on the ground that the January 3, 1973 loan agreement is usurious in that it calls for a payment of a gold coin with a value not less than’$1,000, which is in excess of $12,000 per year (or annual interest rate of 48%) and, therefore, pursuant to Florida Statutes Chapter 687, plaintiff has forfeited both the interest and the principal. After hearing argument of counsel on this motion, the trial judge dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

Plaintiff on appeal principally argues that the transaction is not usurious inasmuch as the gold doubloon in fact was worth far less than $1,000, and the $25,000 given to the defendants represented an investment, not a loan. We cannot agree.

There must exist an intent on the part of the lender at the time the loan agreement is executed to get more than the legal interest and if the agreement is usurious at that time no subsequent transaction will purge it. Further, the requisite intent is satisfactorily proved if the evidence establishes that the charging or receiving of excessive interest was done with the knowledge of the lender. See Dixon v. Sharp, Fla. 1973, 276 So. 2d 817.

The undisputed evidence reflects that plaintiff drew up the January 3, 1973 agreement which expressly provides that it is a loan and the gold doubloon, which would have a value of not less than $1,000, would be the consideration for the making of the 30 day loan. Thus, the agreement is usurious on its face and plaintiff, an attorney and the preparer of the agreement, knew, or at the very least should have known, it to be usurious. See § 687.071, Fla.Stat, F.S.A. We also considered plaintiff’s remaining points on appeal and find them to be without merit.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Antonelli v. Neumann, 537 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …to the amount of actual loan payments), aff’d, 861 F. 2d 725 (11th Cir.1988). For these reasons, we hold that no competent substantial evidence supports the judgment. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SCHWARTZ, C.J., concurs. . Relying on Atwood v. Fisher, 330 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1976), Neumann argues that the letter is irrelevant to show intent at the time of the execution of the documents. In Atwood, this court stated that “[t]here must exist an intent on the part of the le…
  • Schwab v. Quitoni, 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …did not so provide. The project failed, so the opportunity to participate in the provision provided for in the mortgage never arose. Appellant has failed to prove his defense of usury. See Dezell v. King, 91 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1956); Atwood v. Fisher, 330 So. 2d 62 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Diversified Enterprises, Inc., v. West, 141 So. 2d 27 (Fla.2d DCA 1962). Regarding the execution of the note by the appellant, there is conflicting testimony as to whether or not he intended to personally guarantee it, or to sign…

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