ANTHONY C. ALBURY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that separate sentences for breaking and entering and for involuntary sexual battery are permissible when they constitute distinct acts.
The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony and involuntary sexual battery on four counts. He received separat…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Involuntary Sexual Battery cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant was informed against by a four count information, charging him with two counts of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony therein, to wit: involuntary sexual battery and assault; and two counts of involuntary sexual battery. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged on all counts. Thereupon, the trial judge adjudicated the defendant guilty and sentenced him as follows: As to Count I, he sentenced him to life imprisonment; as to Count II, he sentenced him to 15 years at hard labor; as to Count III, he sentenced him to life imprisonment; and as to Count IV, he sentenced him to 15 years at hard labor. This appeal ensued, the appellant contending it was error to impose separate sentences for each of the four convictions in that each breaking and entering count is, in fact, a facet of a single transaction, to wit: each involuntary sexual battery count, and as such the only sentence that could be imposed in each instance is for the highest offense. We disagree with this contention.
On two separate days the appellant committed two separate acts: (1) the act of breaking and entering, and (2) the act of involuntary sexual battery. Therefore, we affirm the sentences. See: Amerson v. State, Fla.App.1974, 303 So. 2d 377; Estevez v. State, Fla. 1975, 313 So. 2d 692: Slater v. State, Fla. 1975, 316 So. 2d 539; Jenkins v. Wainwright, Fla. 1975, 322 So. 2d 477.
The appellant has also urged other errors, which we find to be without merit. See: Miller v. State, Fla.App.1958, 102 So. 2d 737; Matera v. State, Fla.App.1969, 218 So. 2d 180; Harris v. State, Fla.App.1969, 229 So. 2d 670; Wetherington v. State, Fla.App.1972, 263 So. 2d 294; Roberts v. State, Fla.App.1975, 320 So. 2d 832; Rule 3.390(d), RCrP. Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the adjudication and sentences here under review be and the same are hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Darius Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975)
- Ciro Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975)
- Jenkins v. Louie L. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1975)
- Matera v. State, 218 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Wetherington v. State, 263 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Harris v. State, 229 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Roberts v. State, 320 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Amerson v. State, 303 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Forsythe v. Cary, 102 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Bennie Mark Miller v. State, 102 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)