CITY OF MIAMI BEACH
v.
KAY ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari challenging an order overruling motions to strike and dismiss a zoning challenge. The court held that whether zoning restrictions on the respondents' property should be removed depends on whether the adjacent lots (6, 7, and 8) are acquired by the city for park purposes, applying precedent from First Trust Co.
The petition for certiorari is denied, but the case is remanded to the lower court to determine whether the City acquires lots 6, 7, and 8 for park purposes. If acquired, the case is governed by City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., which would support removal of zoning restrictions. If the city fails to acquire the property within a reasonable time, the lower court's order should be quashed under the authority of City of Miami Beach v. Lackman.
“All the elements that induced the removal of zoning restrictions in the Firestone properties apply to respondents' properties; provided, however, no final judgment should be entered in this cause until it can be determined by the lower court whether or not the City of Miami Beach shall acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, Lots 6, 7 and 8 above mentioned”
Establishes the conditional basis for potentially removing zoning restrictions, contingent on the city's acquisition of adjacent property for park purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondents owned five lots in Indian Beach Corporation's Subdivision in Miami Beach, zoned R-AA Estate District (single family residence) under ordin…
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TERRELL, Justice.
This case was submitted to the court at the same time City of Miami Beach v. Ralph Lackman et al. and other cases (ten in all) were submitted. 71 So. 2d 148. Disposition was delayed because certiorari had been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States and was pending at.the time the other cases were considered. Since certiorari has been denied, we now proceed to disposition of the cause. See Hogan v. City of Miami Beach, 346 U.S. 819, 74 S.Ct. 33; Elsalto Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 346 U.S. 820, 74 S.Ct. 34.
The amended bill of complaint prayed that zoning ordinance 289 of the City of Miami Beach enacted December 20, 1930, restricting the use of plaintiff’s property to R-AA Estate District, (single family residence) be decreed to be unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and unconstitutional and that this court permanently enjoin the City of Miami Beach from enforcing said zoning ordinance against the plaintiff’s property, the same being lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, Indian Beách Corporations Subdivision according to the amended plat of said subdivision, recorded in plat book 8, at page 61 of the public records of Dade County, Florida.
A motion to strike and a motion to dismiss the amended bill were overruled. We are confronted with an appeal by certiorari to review and quash this order. The property of respondents is bounded on the north by Lots 6, 7, and 8, Indian Beach Corporation’s Amended Subdivision, which is being condemned by the City of Miami Beach for park or public bathing beach purposes. It is bounded on t'he east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Firestone Estate and on the west by Collins Avenue or Indian Creek. If the condemnation proceedings are completed and the city acquires Lots 6, 7 and 8 for park or bathing beach purposes, it will form a natural barrier 300 feet across to the north of petitioners’ property which, will isolate and leave it in the samé situation-as the Firestone Estate which we dealt. with in City of Miami Beach v.
First Trust Co., Fla., 45 So. 2d 681. All the .elements that induced the removal, of zoning, restrictions in the Firestone prop-, erties apply to respondents’ properties; provided, however, no final judgment should be entered in this cause until it can be de termined by the lower - court whether or-not the City of Miami Beach shall acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, Lots -6, 7 and-8 above mentioned, or whether it has elected to not acquire such property for park purposes. If and when the title to such lots for park purposes is acquired, we think the case is'ruled by the City of Miami Beach v.
First Trust Co., last-cited. See" also Town of Surfside v. Normandy Beach Development Co., 57 So. 2d 844. If, however, the' City of Miami Beach should fail to acquire the property for park purposes, then this casé would be ruled by City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, filed December 11, 1953; unless such property is acquired by the City of Miami Beach for park purposes within a reasonable time to be determined by the Chancellor, then certiorari should issue and the order should be quashed under the authority of our case last above mentioned and filed December 11, 1953.
The petition for certiorari is accordingly denied.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and SEBRING, MATHEWS and DREW, JJ., concur. THOMAS', J., agrees to conclusion.
HOBSON, J., not participating.
On Rehearing Granted
TERRELL, Justice.
This. case was submitted to. the court at the same time City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, and other cases (ten -in all) were submitted. 71 So. 2d 148. . Disposition was delayed because certiorari had been taken to the Supreme Court-of-the United States and was pending at the time the other cases were-considered. Since certiorari has been denied we now proceed to disposition of the cause: See Hogan v. City of Miami Beach, 346 U.S. 819, 74 S.Ct. 33; Elsalto Real Estate, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 346 U.S. 820, 74 S.Ct. 34.
The amended bill of complaint prayed that zoning ordinance 289 of the City of Miami Beach enacted December 20, 1930, restricting the use of plaintiff’s property to R-AA Estate 'District (single family residence) be decreed to be unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and unconstitutional and that this court permanently enjoin the City of Miami Beach from enforcing said zoning ordinance against the plaintiff’s property, the same being Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Indian Beach Corporation’s Subdivision according to the amended plat of said subdivision, recorded in Plat Book 8, at page 61 of the public records of Dade County, Florida.
A motion to strike and a motion to dismiss the amended bill were overruled. We are confronted with an appeal by certiorari to review and quash this order. The property of respondents is bounded on the north by a series of lots identified as Lots 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, Indian Beach Corporation’s Amended Subdivision, some of which are being condemned or otherwise acquired by the City of Miami Beach for public purposes. It is bounded on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Firestone Estate and on the west by Collins Avenue or Indian Creek. If the condemnation proceedings are completed Or the city acquires, by condemnation or direct purchase or otherwise, all or a part of the area identified as Lots 6 through 11, inclusive, for public use, it will form a natural-barrier across to the north of petitioner’s property which will isolate and leave it in the same situation as the Firestone Estate which we dealt with in City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., Fla., 45 So. 2d 681. All the elements that induced the removal of zoning restrictions in the Firestone properties would then apply to respondent’s properties.
The petition for certiorari is accordingly denied.
It is so ordered. - ROBERTS, C. J., and SEBRING, HOB-SON and MATHEWSy JJ., concur. THOMAS and DREW, JJ., agree to conclusion.
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Gusto Tollius v. City OF Miami, 96 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1957)…r to them. Upon rehearing, however, the court concluded that the principles embraced in the main opinion should not be abandoned, but that the complaining property owners were, after all, entitled to relief, citing City of Miami Beach v. Kay, Fla., 71 So. 2d 725; City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., [*125] Fla., 45 So. 2d 681; and Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 68 So. 2d 827. We cannot agree with the chancellor that the question whether or not the propriety of the restrictions on the use of the ap…
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City OF Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1957)…de the city’s authority absent a paramount constitutional right which is not shozvn in this case.” (Emphasis added.) At the time the Lachman case was pending, we were also considering on certiorari the case of City of Miami Beach v. Kay, Fla. 1954, 71 So. 2d 725. The property involved in the Kay litigation lay to the south and adjacent to the property which the City of Miami Beach was seeking to condemn and [*476] which is referred to in City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, supra, and City of Miami Beach v. Elsalt…
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City of Miami v. Ross et ux., 76 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1954)…the principles of law stated therein. Upon reconsideration of the facts involved in this particular case, however, we are persuaded that the facts are sufficiently analogous to those with which we were concerned in City of Miami Beach v. Kay, Fla., 71 So. 2d 725, City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., Fla., 45 So. 2d 681, and Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 68 So. 2d 827, to require an af-firmance of the decree of the lower court. We therefore recede from the judgment heretofore entered, and hold th…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953)
- City of Miami Beach v. First Tr. Co., 45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1949)
- Weisbrod v. United States, 346 U.S. 819 (U.S. 1953)
- Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 346 U.S. 819 (U.S. 1953)
- Gehman v. Smith, 346 U.S. 820 (U.S. 1953)
- Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 346 U.S. 820 (U.S. 1953)
- Town of Surfside v. Normandy Beach Dev. Co., 57 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1952)