CLYDE W. MCARTHUR, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant challenged a trial court's decision to defer adjudication and sentencing on three counts after he pled guilty to four counts and received a three-year sentence on the first count. The First District Court of Appeal held that trial courts lack authority to indefinitely defer adjudication and sentencing and must either sentence a defendant or place him on probation.
A trial court lacks authority to defer adjudication and sentencing from day to day or term to term. When a person is adjudged guilty, the trial judge must either sentence the defendant or place him on probation, except in limited circumstances involving procedural delays or obtaining information for sentencing purposes.
[1] A trial court may not defer adjudication and sentence from day to day and term to term.
[2] A convicted person is entitled to know when they are no longer subject to the court's power to impose a sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the power of trial judges to hold in abeyance the passage of sentences and to impose them any time in the future, regardless of probation, is disapproved.”
Establishes the core holding that indefinite deferral of sentencing is without legal authority
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant pled guilty to all four counts of an information. After presentence investigation, the trial court adjudged him guilty and sentenced him to …
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McCORD, Judge.
Appellant pled guilty to all four counts of an information. After presentence investigation and report, he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on the first count. As to the three remaining counts, the trial court announced, “I defer adjudication and sentence from day to day and term to term.” Appellant contends such deferment was in error. In Baggett v. State, Fla.App. (2d), 302 So. 2d 206 (1974), the trial court had adjudicated guilt on two counts, sentenced on one and deferred sentence on the other from “day to day and term to term.” Citing State v. Bateh, Fla., 110 So. 2d 7 (1959), our sister court of the Second District held the order in Baggett to be erroneous and reversed stating:
“Apart from the potential consequences inherent in a sentence to a definite term of probation we know of no authority to defer either from day to day or from term to term the imposition of-a sentence of imprisonment.”
We agree and are enable to see that there is any less error in deferring adjudication and sentence from day to day and term to term. As the Supreme Court said in Ba-teh :
“ . . . the power of trial judges to hold in abeyance the passage of sentences and to impose them any time in the future, regardless of probation, is disapproved. For procedural reasons such as the determination of ‘motions and other matters arising between verdict and judgment, [or for the purpose of] gaining information necessary to the-imposition of a just sentence; or during the pendency of other charges, or for other good and valid reasons,’ to quote from Bateh v. State, supra, the language copied in Helton v. State, supra [Fla., 106 So. 2d 79], there may be justifiable delay, and when convicts are put on probation the sentences, of course, may be deferred conditioned on obedience to the terms of probation. But it was plainly the view of the district court, and it is now the view of this court, that one convicted of an offense is entitled to know just when in his life, he meanwhile being at liberty, he is no longer subject to the power of the court to translate his liberty to imprisonment.
The upshot of this discussion is that when a person is adjudged guilty of an offense the trial judge should, in the absence of the circumstances outlined, either sentence him or place him on probation. This procedure would obviate for all time the possibility that a convict wandering around because he had not been actually sentenced could be summoned into court at any time, regardless of the march of the years, and sentenced for a term which would long since have expired had it been imposed in the beginning.”
The same reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bateh and the District Court in Baggett as to deferral of sentence would apply equally to deferral of adjudication and sentence. Compare State v. Sweetman, Fla. App. (4th), 302 So. 2d 164 (1974). Although the appellant in the case sub judice is not at liberty (he having been sentenced to three years imprisonment on the first count), he is entitled to have all of the charges to which he had pled guilty disposed of expeditiously and not held in a state of limbo.
The judgment and sentence on the first count are affirmed. The deferral of adjudication and sentence as to each of the remaining counts is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to adjudicate said counts and make appropriate disposition thereof.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Rozmestor v. State, 381 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…the march of the years.” State v. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1959); Laniero v. Wainwright, 347 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Kishel v. State, 351 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Green v. State, 354 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); McArthur v. State, 330 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). In Segal v. Wainwright, 304 So. 2d 446 (Fla.1974), the Florida Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument that the defendant should serve a five year robbery sentence with a one year sentence and a nine year sentence sandwiche…
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Jones v. State, 336 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…ecord furnished us would not have been sufficient for us to determine whether the court erred. The trial court did err in deferring adjudication and sentencing on the crime of assault and battery from day to day and term to term. McArthur v. State, 330 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Jones is entitled to have, all offenses of which he was found guilty disposed of expeditiously. The judgments and sentences on the first three crimes are affirmed. The deferral of adjudication and sentence on the crime of assau…
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Dupree v. State, 384 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…the judge did not defer sentencing for purposes of probation or for matters arising after the verdict and judgment. Dupree is entitled to have the charges against him disposed of expeditiously and not be held in a state of limbo. MacArthur v. State, 330 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence on the first count are affirmed. The deferral of sentencing as to count two is reversed, and this case is remanded with directions to make an appropriate disposition thereof. ROBERT P.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Mussa C. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959)
- Helton v. State, 106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958)
- State v. Sweetman, 302 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Baggett v. State, 302 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)