CHARLIE VINING AND VELMA VINING, WIFE OF CHARLIE VINING, APPELLANTS,
v.
AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEMS, INC., APPELLEE
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The Vinings sued Avis for damages after a stolen rental car, negligently left unattended with keys in the ignition, was used by a thief to collide with their vehicle. The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint, holding that an intervening criminal act (the theft) breaks the chain of causation, precluding recovery even if Avis violated a statute requiring keys be removed from unattended vehicles.
No. Although Avis violated Florida Statute § 316.097 by leaving the keys in the ignition, an intervening criminal act (the theft) breaks the chain of causation between Avis's negligence and the plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs cannot recover because the damages were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Avis's negligence.
[1] A violation of a statute prohibiting leaving a motor vehicle unattended with the keys in the ignition constitutes evidence of negligence.
[2] An intervening criminal act generally breaks the chain of proximate causation between the original negligence and the resulting injury.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Proximate cause is defined as, 'that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'”
Establishes the legal standard for proximate causation that the court applied to reject liability.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn Avis rental car was left unattended at Miami International Airport with the ignition keys in the ignition, the door open, and lights on. A thief st…
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NATHAN, Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Charlie Vining and Velma Vining, his wife, from an order of the trial court dismissing with prejudice the remaining counts of their third amended complaint against defendant Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. An Avis rental automobile was stolen from the Avis lot at the Miami International Airport. While driving the rental car, the thief negligently collided with the automobile driven by Charlie Vining. Vining sued Avis for damages for injuries sustained in the collision, charging that Avis left the vehicle unattended with the ignition keys in the ignition and with the door open and the lights burning in such a manner as to attract attention to the vehicle. This negligence was alleged to have proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. Avis filed a motion to dismiss citing this court’s decision in Lingefelt v. Hanner, Fla.App.1960, 125 So. 2d 325, which absolved the owner of a car of liability for damages caused by a car thief, despite the fact that the owner negligently left the ignition switch unlocked. The trial court granted Avis’ motion to dismiss with prejudice and this appeal ensued.
The plaintiffs contend that Avis is in violation of § 316.097, Fla.Stat., entitled “Unattended motor vehicle,” which in part provides,
“No person driving or in charge of any motor vehicle . . . shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and removing the key. . . . ”
Although violation of a state statute is evidence of neglilgence,1 we follow the reasoning of Lingefelt v. Hanner, supra, wherein it is held that the determinative issue is one of causation. Assuming Avis’ act of leaving the keys in the ignition in violation of the statute was evidence of of negligence, the plaintiffs still could not recover unless such negligent act was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Proximate cause is defined as, “that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” 23 Fla. Jur., Negligence, § 26, and cases cited therein. The courts of Florida adhere to the general principle that an intervening criminal act breaks the chain of causation. Accordingly, the original negligence of the defendant Avis, in leaving the keys in the ignition, was not the proximate cause of the damages resulting from the intervening criminal act. Lingefelt v. Hanner, supra; Bryant v. Atlantic Car Rental, Inc., Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 910.
There can be no recovery for damages where, as here, the injuries were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence such that a person, by prudent human foresight could anticipate that the damages incurred will likely result from the defendant’s negligence. Cone v. Inter County Telephone & Telegraph Company, Fla.1949, 40 So. 2d 148. We conclude that there is no reasonable basis upon which a jury could determine that the plaintiffs’ damages were proximately caused by Avis’ negligence.
We regard the question of foreseeability and proximate cause under the facts presented on this appeal to be of such importance that it should be settled by the Supreme Court of Florida. We have determined, therefore, that the decision in this cause will be certified to the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to the Florida Constitution, Art. V, § 3(b)(3).
The order dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
. Clark v. Sumner, Fla.1954, 72 So. 2d 375; Bryant v. Swarts, Fla.App.1969, 227 So. 2d 715.
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Vining v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977)…nduct of a thief who steals the car and subsequently injures someone while negligently operating the stolen vehicle. The cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, reported at 330 So. 2d 550 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). In light of the great public interest involved, the court below has certified the cause to this Court, pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. The facts in the instant case as alleged b…
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Solomon Schwartz v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 334 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…rdinance or state statute has been demonstrated. We regard the question involved in this case to be of such importance that we have certified to the Supreme Court of Florida a similar decision in the case of Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Fla. App.1976, 330 So. 2d 550. The summary final judgment in favor of the defendants is affirmed. . The judgment purports to be in favor of “the defendants.” We are unable to ascertain from the record whether the third party defendant, Johnson, was ever served or participated…
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Almeida v. Trushin, 368 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979)…ADKINS, Justice. Certiorari was granted in this cause to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, 4th District, (330 So. 2d 550) on ground of direct conflict with the opinion of this Court in Vining v. Avis Rent-a-Car Systems, Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla.1977), on the question of liability in the event a thief steals an automobile, with key in the ignition, and subsequently inj…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cone v. Inter Cnty. Tel. Tel. Co., 40 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1949)
- Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Clark v. Sumner, 72 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1954)
- Bryant v. Atl. CAR Rental, Inc., 127 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Bryant v. Swarts, 227 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)