JOHN PEARCE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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John Pearce was charged with conspiracy to commit perjury alongside Ronald Brooks and David Pfaff. After Brooks and Pfaff were acquitted, Pearce moved to dismiss the conspiracy charge, arguing it is legally impossible to convict one person of conspiring with himself. The court granted his motion, holding that when all named co-conspirators are acquitted, the conspiracy charge must fail because the essence of conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons.
A conspiracy conviction cannot stand when all named co-conspirators have been acquitted. The court held that the essential element of conspiracy—an agreement between two or more persons—is destroyed by the acquittal of all alleged co-conspirators, making conviction of a single defendant legally impossible.
[1] A conviction for conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons.
[2] If a conspiracy charge names specific co-conspirators and those co-conspirators are acquitted, a conviction of the remaining alleged conspirator must be reversed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The gravamen of the offense in criminal conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons. With whom is Pearce charged with conspiring? Clearly, it is Brooks and Pfaff. And just as clearly Brooks and Pfaff have been adjudged not guilty.”
Establishes that conspiracy requires multiple conspirators and when all named co-conspirators are acquitted, the essential element of the offense is destroyed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePearce, Brooks, and Pfaff were charged with conspiring to commit perjury in a judicial proceeding on September 22, 1973, in Liberty County, Florida. B…
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RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge.
On the 15th day of January, 1976, the State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit filed an amended information charging that John Pearce (petitioner), Ronald Brooks and David Pfaff, on the 22nd day of September, 1973, in the County of Liberty, State of Florida, “did knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously agree, conspire and confederate one with the others to commit a felony of perjury in a judicial proceeding”. (emphasis supplied) Defendants Brooks and Pfaff stood trial and were acquitted. Subsequent to the acquittal of Brooks and Pfaff, petitioner Pearce sought dismissal of the foregoing information predicated upon the legal impossibility of convicting a single individual of conspiring with himself. The trial judge denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss citing Platt v. State, 143 Neb. 131, 8 N.W. 2d 849 (1943).
Upon consideration of Pearce’s petition for writ of common law certiorari, and finding that a strong prima facie case had been alleged that the trial court had departed from the essential requirements of law, this court, in exercising its discretion, issued the writ. The Nebraska case of Platt v. State, supra, does not support the trial court’s order. There, Platt and another named defendant were charged with conspiring with each other and with other persons in defrauding the state. Platt was tried separately and convicted. Subsequently, the other named party was acquitted. Platt contended that the subsequent acquittal of the other named conspirator mandated that his conviction be set aside. In rejecting this contention, the Nebraska court stated: “There can be no question that there must be a degree of dependent criminality between coconspirators to violate a criminal statute in order for a conviction to stand.” The Nebraska court then reasoned that a subsequent acquittal of a coconspirator would not vitiate Platt’s conviction.
However, such is not the case here presented.
The gravamen of the offense in criminal conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons. With whom is Pearce charged with conspiring? Clearly, it is Brooks and Pfaff. And just as clearly Brooks and Pfaff have been adjudged not guilty. The verdicts as to Brooks and Pfaff vitiate the very essence of the conspiracy: the combination or agreement of two or more persons. The rule in this jurisdiction was succinctly stated by Judge Hobson, speaking for the Second District Court of Appeal in Filer v. State, 285 So. 2d 669 (Fla.App.2nd 1973), viz:
“But where the information or indictment alleges that the defendant and other individuals named as co-defendants were the sole perpetrators of the conspiracy, and the other individuals were acquitted, conviction must be reversed. Herman v. United States, 5th Cir. 1961, 289 F. 2d 362; Romontio v. United States, 10th Cir. 1968, 400 F. 2d 618; cf. Lubin v. United States, 9th Cir. 1963, 313 F. 2d 419; United States v. Cabrera, 5th Cir. 1971, 447 F. 2d 956; United States v. Sparrow, 10th Cir. 1972, 470 F. 2d 885.”
Certiorari is granted with directions that the trial court grant the subject motion to dismiss.
MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1996)…ency, when all named accused conspirators are tried together and no unidentified conspirators are alleged and all but one of the conspirators are acquitted, the verdict against the remaining conspirator will not be allowed to stand. Pearce v. State, 330 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1976). The trial court granted the motion. The First District Court of Appeal, which had previously adopted the rule of consistency in Pearce, affirmed the trial court and certified the above questi…1 / 2
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State v. Simpson, 347 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1977)…y drawn to be saved by restrictive interpretation. It is an unconstitutional law which can only produce more harm than good. It is useless, yet dangerous, and should be eliminated. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent. . Pearce v. State, 330 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); U. S. v. Feo.., 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). . Roberts v. U. S., 416 F. 2d 1216, 1220 (5th Cir.1969). . 330 So. 2d 3 (Fla.1976). . 317 So. 2d 750 (Fla.1976).…
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Sparkman v. State, 528 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…cocaine. In this timely appeal, the appellant contends only that his conviction on the conspiracy charge must be reversed. We agree. The gravamen of the offense of criminal conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons. Pearce v. State, 330 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1976). Where, as here, the information does not allege that the coconspirator is unknown to the state and the only other person named in the charging document as having conspired with a defendant is…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1961)
- Eli Lubin and Glenn M. Tharp, Jr. v. United States, 313 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1963)
- Romontio v. United States, 400 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1968)
- United States v. Sparrow, 470 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1972)
- United States v. Augustin Hernandez Cabrera, 447 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1971)
- Filer v. State, 285 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)