EDUARDO COALLA, APPELLANT,
v.
MARILYN S. COALLA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of permanent alimony to the wife but reversed portions of the judgment regarding the wife's use of the marital home and child support obligations extending beyond age 18. The court held that child support cannot extend past age 18 absent an agreement, and that exclusive possession of entireties property cannot be awarded except as lump sum alimony or to enforce child support obligations.
The court affirmed the permanent alimony award but reversed the other two provisions. The court held that granting exclusive possession of entireties property is impermissible unless it takes the form of lump sum alimony or is awarded to a custodial mother to enforce child support obligations. Additionally, child support cannot extend beyond age 18 absent an agreement by the father, and the wife's exclusive use of the home should exist only while at least one child under 18 resides with her.
[1] A trial court may not grant exclusive possession of entireties property to one party in a dissolution judgment unless it is a lump sum alimony award or necessary to enfor…
[2] Upon a judgment of dissolution, entireties property is owned by the parties as tenants in common unless otherwise specified by law or court order.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The granting of exclusive possession of entireties property to one of the parties in a final judgment of dissolution is, we think, anathema unless it either takes the form of a lump sum alimony award or is so awarded to a wife and mother of minor children of whom she has custody so as to enforce the husband-father's obligation to support and maintain the children.”
Establishes the legal standard for awarding exclusive possession of entireties property in dissolution cases
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEduardo Coalla appealed a final judgment dissolving his marriage to Marilyn Coalla. The trial court awarded permanent alimony to the wife, granted the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Child Support Duration cases and more on FLexlaw
HOBSON, Judge.
The appellant husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, attacking the permanent alimony awarded to appellee wife; the awarding to the wife the sole and exclusive use of the marital home owned by the entireties “so long as she may reside there, or until she remarries or dies”; and the awarding of child support to the two minor children “until they each respectively reach the ages of eighteen (18) years. Thereafter, said child support shall continue so long as the respective children continue in school or college, or until the 22nd birthday of each re-, spective child.”
We affirm the award of permanent alir mony to the wife; however, the other two points raised must be reversed.
On the question of the award to the wife of the sole and exclusive use of the marital home held in the entireties so long as she resides there, or remarries or dies, we held-in Saviteer v. McAdoo, Fla.App.2d 1975, 310 So. 2d 28, at page 29:
“The granting of exclusive possession of entireties property to one of the parties in a final judgment of dissolution is, we think, anathema unless it either takes the form of a lump sum alimony award or is so awarded to a wife and mother of minor children of whom she has custody so as to enforce the husband-father’s obligation to support and maintain the children. Neither was the case here. Likewise, if it were intended by the final judgment herein that the husband be given a life estate, which both parties seem to think but with which we disagree, it is equally ineffective." We are aware of no rule of law which would authorize the granting of a life estate under the circumstances here absent a finding of special equity. No such finding was made.
“In any case, whatever interest was awarded husband, we think it propitious to say here, and we so hold, that the final judgment did not change the statutory legal effect of the judgment of dissolution on the aforesaid entireties property.1 That is to say, upon the judgment of dissolution the parties owned the same as tenants in common.
On the question of the award of child support after the 18th birthday of the minor children, we held in Kowalski v. Kowalski, Fla.App.2d 1975, 315 So. 2d 497, at page 498:
“. . . He raises only one meritorious point on appeal, that relating to an award of child support in the sum of $60.00 per week for his son John, who was then seventeen and one half years of age, ‘until the child reaches the age of twenty-one (21) or completes or discontinues his college education, whichever shall first occur.’
“While some of us may wonder why a father would expend the time, money and effort to complain to us because of an order compelling support of his son while the son attempts to secure a college education, we are nevertheless unaware of any authority in this state to enter such an order absent an agreement to that effect on the part of the father.1
Accordingly, the judgment is hereby modified to the extent that the husband shall not be obligated for child support after the children become eighteen years old, and the right of the wife to the exclusive use of the marital home shall exist only so long as at least one child under the age of eighteen years shall be living with her in such home. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
McNULTY, C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur. “i. 689.15, F.S.”
“i. Cf. Perla v. Perla (Fla.1952), 58 So. 2d 689; White v. White (Fla.App.1st, 1974), 296 So. 2d 619 and cases cited therein.”.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…has the opportunity to learn a trade, occupation or profession. . See, e. g., Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1975); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1975); Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Kro [*485] gen v. Krogen, 320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Briggs v. Briggs, 312 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); White…
-
Nicolay v. Jacquelyn Ann Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…s son while the son attempts to secure a college education, we are nevertheless unaware of any authority in this state to enter such an order absent an agreement to that effect on the part of the father. 315 So. 2d at 498. Accord, Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). On the other hand, later opinions of this court, while not explicitly so holding, have moved toward a notion that a court could order a parent involved in a dissolution proceeding to support an adult child in college. Cyr v. Cyr…
-
Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…la. 4th DCA 1975); Berger v. Berger, 182 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), when possession accompanies the award of the husband’s interest in the home as part of lump sum alimony, Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), or where special equities exist in favor of the wife which support her exclusive use and possession, Ranes v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The temporary nature of the wife’s possession of the husband’s undivided inte…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1952)
- Houston R. White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Saviteer v. McADOO, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)