RICHARD STEPHEN LANGDON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Richard Langdon appeals his life sentence for rape, arguing it was illegal because the trial court failed to consider an alternative sentence under Florida law and that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment following his rehabilitation in a sexual offender program. The appellate court affirmed the sentence, holding that it was a legal sentence imposed within the trial judge's discretion.
The life sentence was legal and properly imposed. Appellate courts may only reverse sentences that are illegal, and this sentence was lawful under the applicable statute and within the trial judge's discretion. If the trial judge was unaware of the availability of an alternative sentence, this could be corrected through a post-mandate motion to mitigate.
[1] A sentence is illegal only if it is not authorized by statute.
[2] A trial court is presumed to have exercised its discretion in sentencing unless the record shows otherwise.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellate courts of Florida are only authorized to reverse a sentence when it is an illegal sentence.”
Establishes the standard of review for appellate sentencing challenges—only illegal sentences may be reversed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLangdon was charged with rape and admitted to a mentally disordered sexual offender program pursuant to Florida statute. Following completion of the p…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant was charged with the crime of rape. He was admitted to a mentally disordered sexual offender program, pursuant to § 917.19, Fla.Stat. Following completion of the program, he was returned to face the criminal charges, pursuant to § 917.20 Fla.Stat., whereupon he entered a plea of guilty. After extensive hearing and examination of the records before him, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to life. He appeals and contends that this is an illegal sentence because of the following two reasons: (1) That in imposing sentence, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider § 921.18, Fla.Stat. as a possible alternative sentence. (2) The life, sentence imposed, following the appellant’s rehabilitation, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. I, Section 17 of the Constitution of Florida.
We find neither of these to have merit; the sentence was a legal one. Appellate courts of Florida are only authorized to reverse a sentence when it is an illegal sentence. See: Chavigny v. State, Fla.App.1959, 112 So. 2d 910; Infante v. State, Fla.App.1967, 197 So. 2d 542; Weathington v. State, Fla.App.1972, 262 So. 2d 724; Cole v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 262 So. 2d 902; Wilkinson v. State, Fla.App.1975, 322 So. 2d 620. There is nothing in this record to show the trial judge did not exercise his discretion in imposing the sentence, which was a legal sentence under the statute; it was in conformity with § 917.20, Fla.Stat., supra, which recognized that following successful completion of a rehabilitative program the sex offender would be returned to face the criminal charges and thereby would be subject, upon conviction, to appropriate sentence in accordance with the crime charged.
Counsel has also pointed out that the trial judge may not have been aware that he could have sentenced the appellant to an indeterminate sentence, pursuant to § 921.18, Fla.Stat. It is not clear from the record whether this is the actual case. However, if it is, this is a matter that may be corrected by the trial court upon a motion to mitigate filed subsequent to the mandate of this court, pursuant to Rule 3.800 (b), RCrP. Therefore, the final judgment and sentence here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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State v. Davis, 464 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…ognizing practice of judicial plea discussions and characterizing it as “delicate,” citing Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200, 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)) and sentencing practices, appellate review being limited to unlawful sentences, see Langdon v. State, 330 So. 2d 804, 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Since the passage of sections 921.001, 005, Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701, trial courts no longer enjoy this vast discretion. The de minimis nature of the crime and the defendant’s lac…
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Delon v. State, 332 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Langdon v. State, Fla App.1976, 330 So. 2d 804.…
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Weiss v. State, 359 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975); Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla.1968); Robinson v. State, 338 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Langdon v. State, 330 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); and Lebowitz v. State, 313 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).…
Authorities Cited
- Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Chavigny v. State, 112 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Weathington v. State, 262 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Green v. State, 322 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)