GERALD HAUSMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
RENEE HAUSMAN, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of alimony, attorney's fees, and payment for stocks and bonds to the former wife, rejecting the husband's claim that he lacked financial ability to pay due to voluntary debt arrangements he had made.
The court affirmed all alimony awards and related orders, finding that the trial court properly concluded Gerald's income reduction was voluntary and undertaken to avoid alimony obligations, and that his previous establishment of a lavish standard of living demonstrated his financial ability to maintain his former wife in that manner.
[1] Alimony awards are determined by the husband's ability to pay and the wife's needs, considering the marital standard of living.
[2] A court may infer a husband's financial ability to maintain a certain standard of living for his spouse if he established that standard through his financial contribution…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The primary criteria to be used in establishing the amount of alimony is the husband's ability to pay and the needs of the wife, taking into consideration the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining alimony awards
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGerald and Renee Hausman's four-year marriage was dissolved on April 11, 1975. Although Gerald's 1974 gross income exceeded $164,000, he voluntarily a…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Gerald Hausman, seeks reversal of those provisions of a dissolution of marriage judgment awarding his former wife, Renee, lump sum and permanent periodic alimony and attorney’s fees and directing him to pay her $17,500 for certain stocks and bonds.
On April 11, 1975 the four year marriage between Renee and Gerald Hausman was dissolved. Renee was awarded, inter alia, $10,000 as lump sum alimony, $1,000 alimony per month for one year, $600 monthly thereafter as permanent periodic alimony and $7,500 for a reasonable attorney’s fee. Additionally, Gerald was ordered to pay Renee $17,500 and she in exchange would endorse over to him the Greyhound stock and Central Railroad of New Jersey bonds on which he had indemnified her against loss.
Gerald principally contends the chancellor abused his discretion with respect to the amount of the awards of lump sum and permanent periodic alimony. We cannot agree.
The primary criteria to be used in establishing the amount of alimony is the husband’s ability to pay and the needs of the wife, taking into consideration the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. Firestone v. Firestone, Fla. 1972, 263 So. 2d 223; Hagen v. Hagen, Fla.App.1975, 308 So. 2d 41.
Appellant does not take issue with the needs of appellee and admits to the lavish standard of living established by him during the marriage. He argues that he is financially unable to pay the alimony awards because his liabilities now exceed his assets. It appears that although appellant’s 1974 gross income was in excess of $164,000, in September 1974 because of his debts, he voluntarily agreed to deposit all of his income from whatever source into an account to be controlled by his brother-in-law and from this account he consented to withdraw only $1,160 per month for all of his living expenses. Appellee alleged that this agreement, which was drawn up at about the time she instituted the current proceedings, is merely a device to avoid paying alimony. It is apparent that the chancellor who heard all the testimony and reviewed the documentary evidence presented by the parties concluded that the large reduction of appellant’s income for the most part was brought about voluntarily and not out of necessity with the purpose of avoiding his obligation to pay alimony.
We find there is ample evidence to sustain this conclusion. Cf. McRae v. McRae, Fla. 1951, 52 So. 2d 908; Bergh v. Bergh, Fla.App.1964, 160 So. 2d 145; Gamse v. Gamse, Fla.App.1974, 291 So. 2d 620. Further, where the head of a family by furnishing money over a period of years establishes a certain financial standard of living, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, it may be inferred that he has the financial ability to enable him to continue to maintain his spouse in substantially the same manner of living. See Silvers v. Silvers, Fla.App.1973, 274 So. 2d 555 and cases cited therein. In the final analysis the following quote from Firestone v. Firestone, supra, at 227 appears to be dispositive of this issue of alimony:
“Unfortunately, when the dance of marriage has reached its ‘fine’ and the time arrives to pay the fiddler, the predilections for unrestrained pleasures, more often than not, then turn into hues and cries of poverty and despair. Nonetheless, cloth must be cut to fit the pattern, and if excessive indulgences, as a customary norm, accompany private wealth they may very well establish a pattern.”
We also reviewed appellant’s remaining points on appeal concerning the stocks and bonds and attorney’s fee and find no reversible error. Affirmed.
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McALLISTER v. McALLISTER, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…the record that he could not have finished his education but for her earnings. . Points 4 through 7 above include: DeCastro v. DeCastro, 334 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); Dorman v. Dorman, 332 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Hausman v. Hausman, 330 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); Norton v. Norton, 328 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Gall v. Gall, 336 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976); Fugassi v. Fugassi, 332 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); In re Marriage of Stevens, 327 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Sommes…
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Sarron v. Barbel I. Sarron, 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…DCA 1982); Pino v. Pino, 418 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Kuvin v. Kuvin, 412 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Vanderslice v. Vanderslice, 396 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Murray v. Murray, 374 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hausman v. Hausman, 330 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).…
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Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…al needs must also be measured in part by taking into consideration the extremely high standard of living to which the wife accustomed the husband through nine years of marriage. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1972); Hausman v. Hausman, 330 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). The wife accustomed the husband to a life style which costs over $5,000 a month to maintain during a marriage which can hardly be described as a “marry in June and sue the followin…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972)
- McRae v. McRae, 52 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1951)
- Hagen v. Hagen, 308 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Bergh v. Bergh, 160 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Gwenn Cantor Gamse v. Edmond Gamse, 291 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Silvers v. Silvers, 274 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)