STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
CHARLES LEWIS RAY, JR., A/K/A CHARLES L. RAY, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a District Court decision that vacated a sentence for attempted sexual battery based on the single transaction rule. The Court held that attempted sexual battery and breaking and entering with intent to commit sexual battery are separate offenses allowing multiple sentences, resolving an apparent conflict with prior precedent.
Attempted sexual battery and breaking and entering with intent to commit sexual battery are separate offenses, and multiple sentences may be imposed for convictions of both offenses, even if they arise from the same occasion or event.
[1] Separate sentences may be imposed for offenses arising from a single transaction if each offense requires proof of an element not present in the other.
[2] The single transaction rule does not preclude separate sentences for offenses that are not essential elements of each other.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the attempted sexual battery for which the appellant was convicted was an essential element of the breaking and entering charge”
The District Court's rationale for vacating the attempted sexual battery sentence under the single transaction rule
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant entered guilty pleas to sexual battery, attempted sexual battery, and breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit sexua…
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PER CURIAM.
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 320 So. 2d 426, because of an asserted conflict with the decisions of this Court in Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1975), and Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1975). Jurisdiction is provided under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
In the case under review the trial court entered judgments, upon guilty pleas, for sexual battery, attempted sexual battery and breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: sexual battery, and, after having entered, making an assault upon a woman lawfully within the dwelling house. The event which was the subject of the judgment for sexual battery occurred on a date separate from the event giving rise to the other two judgments. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to 15 years for the sexual battery. Concurrent five-year sentences were imposed for the other two offenses to run consecutive to the 15-year sentence.
While affirming all three judgments the District Court ordered that the sentence for attempted sexual battery be vacated as violating the single transaction rule. It held that “the attempted sexual battery for which the appellant was convicted was an essential element of the breaking and entering charge.” In Jenkins, supra, this Court upheld the imposition of separate sentences for possession of cannabis sativa and possession of an hallucinogenic drug even though the defendant was found in possession of the two separate drug substances on the same occasion. In Estevez, supra, we held that “breaking and entering and grand larceny are separate offenses, not facets of the same transaction, and that two separate sentences may be imposed upon conviction of the two offenses.” The convictions in Estevez grew out of a single occurrence.
To resolve the apparent conflict between Jenkins and Estevez and the decision here reviewed we granted the petition for writ of certiorari and dispensed with oral argument. After a careful review of the briefs submitted by the parties, we conclude that the decision in the instant case conflicts with the principles enunciated in Jenkins and Estevez. We are persuaded that these cases represent the proper rule of law applicable to the case at bar. See also Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla.1975). Accordingly, that portion of the decision of the District Court which vacates the sentence for attempted sexual battery is quashed with directions to remand to the trial court for reinstatement of the original sentence.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
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Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1982)…at the identity or discreteness of the criminal elements, at other times at the identity or discreteness of the evidentiary proof. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 366 So. 2d 418 (Fla.1978); State v. Heisterman, 343 So. 2d 1272 (Fla.1977); State v. Ray, 331 So. 2d 316 (Fla.1976); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1975); Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1975); Foster v. State, 286 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1973); Cone v. State, 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1973); Williams v. State, 337 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), a…
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Johnson v. State, 366 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1978)…osed only for the more serious offense. But the court concluded that Cone has been effectively overruled by the holdings of this Court in Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1975); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1975) and State v. Ray, 331 So. 2d 316 (Fla.1976). In McClain the court upheld the separate sentences, citing only Estevez and Swyers v. State, 334 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). In both cases the record indicates and the evidence showed that the display in question took place in the co…
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Davis v. State, 392 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…(3) Davis’ contention that he could not be separately and consecutively sentenced on the kidnapping charge, an offense he says arose out of the same criminal episode as the robbery, is without merit, § 775.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1979); see State v. Ray, 331 So. 2d 316 (Fla.1976); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1975); Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1975), and this result is not altered by the fact that a consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentence attached to the kidnapping count, see Vann…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Darius Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975)
- Ciro Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975)
- Jenkins v. Louie L. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1975)
- RAY v. State, 320 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)