WILLIE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Williams appealed his sentence for arson of an automobile, arguing it was illegal. The court vacated the sentence because the trial judge lacked statutory authority to impose a split sentence (imprisonment followed by probation) for a crime committed before the effective date of the statutory amendment authorizing such sentences for felonies.
The trial judge lacked authority to impose the split sentence because the offense occurred before the July 1, 1974 amendment to § 948.01(4), which first granted judges the power to use split sentencing for felonies. Prior to that date, split sentencing was available only for misdemeanors.
[1] A split sentence, combining incarceration followed by probation, is statutorily permissible for felonies only after the effective date of the amendment to Section 948.01(…
[2] A sentence imposing a period of incarceration followed by probation for a felony committed before the effective date of the amendment to Section 948.01(4), Florida Statut…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“prior to July 1, 1974, the provisions of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), granted specific authority to the trial judge to prescribe a period in the county jail followed by probation for those offenses punishable only by imprisonment in the county jail (misdemeanor offenses). It is our opinion that the term 'whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed' is descriptive of the offenses to which the subparagraph was applicable. The new amendment to Section 948.-01(4), effective July 1, 1974, expands the trial judge's specific statutory authority to include felonies as well as misdemeanors in the use of the split sentence probation alternative.”
Establishes that split sentencing authority for felonies did not exist before July 1, 1974, and that the amendment expanded the judge's authority on that date.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was charged with arson of an automobile on June 15, 1974. He pleaded guilty on July 23, 1974. On November 1, 1974, he was sentenced to three …
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[*34] DOWNEY, Judge.
Appellant was charged with arson of an automobile on June 15, 1974, in violation of § 806.03 F.S.1974. On July 23, 1974, appellant pleaded guilty and on November 1, 1974, he was sentenced to the Division of Corrections for a term of three years (with credit for four days jail time), provided that after he had served twelve months of said term he should be placed on probation for a period of four years. Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the foregoing sentence is illegal and that “the illegal portion of the sentence be stricken.”
As the Supreme Court of Florida pointed out in State v. Jones, Fla.1976, 327 So. 2d 18, 24:
“. . . prior to July 1, 1974, the provisions of Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973), granted specific authority to the trial judge to prescribe a period in the county jail followed by probation for those offenses punishable only by imprisonment in the county jail (misdemeanor offenses). It is our opinion that the term ‘whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed’ is descriptive of the offenses to which the subparagraph was applicable. The new amendment to Section 948.-01(4), effective July 1, 1974, expands the trial judge’s specific statutory authority to include felonies as well as misdemeanors in the use of the split sentence probation alternative.” (Emphasis added.)
The problem in this case is that the offense with which appellant was charged took place before the effective date of the amendment to § 948.01 F.S., so that the trial judge did not have the authority to utilize the split sentence procedure in sentencing appellant to the Division of Corrections.
Accordingly, the sentence appealed from is vacated and the cause is remanded with directions to resentence appellant.
CROSS and OWEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Bush v. State, 338 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…edure to include felonies. Appellant contends that the trial court did not have authority to sentence him to a split sentence under Section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, as amended effective July 1, 1974. We agree upon authority of Williams v. State, 332 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Accordingly, the sentence appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to vacate the sentence and resen-tence appellant. MAGER, C. J., and ALDERMAN, J., concur.…
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Wilcox v. State, 349 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…e split sentence probation alternative.” Standing alone, the above quoted paragraph appears to fully support Wilcox’s contention that his 1973 felony split sentence was illegal. In further support of his proposition, Wilcox cites Williams v. State, 332 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), in which Williams pled guilty to a felony on June 15, 1974, and was sentenced to the Division of Corrections for a term of three years, provided that after he served 12 months of said term he should be placed on probation for a…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976)