STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ARTHUR GENE CANNON AND LACEY HOLLINGSWORTH, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1976-05-14
No. 75-1848
Schwartz, Alan R., J., Walden, C. J., Cross, J.
332 So. 2d 127 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 26 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florida's automatic stay statute for interlocutory appeals from suppression orders does not extend speedy trial time without a judicial order under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the trial court properly discharged the defendant when the state failed to obtain such an order.


Holding

An order under Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv), F.R. Cr.P. is required to extend speedy trial time during an interlocutory appeal by the state from a suppression order, and Fla.Stat. § 924.071(2)'s automatic stay provision does not supersede this requirement.


Headnotes

[1] An automatic stay provision in a statute does not extend speedy trial time during an interlocutory appeal from a suppression order when the Florida Rules of Criminal Proc…

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Key Quotes

“A contrary ruling would mean that the state could automatically deprive a defendant of the benefits of the Speedy Trial Rule, which did not exist when Fla.Stat. § 924.071(2) was adopted, merely by filing an appeal from an order of suppression and without any judicial determination that the appeal was not frivolous or had not been taken simply for the purpose of securing such a delay.”

Court explaining why the automatic stay statute cannot supersede the rule requiring judicial orders for extension

Facts & Procedural History

The state appealed an order suppressing evidence and relied on an automatic stay statute to extend the speedy trial period without obtaining a judicia…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge.

SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge.

We agree with the trial judge and the Third District decision in Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla.App.3rd 1975), cert. den. 317 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1975), that an order under Rule 3.191(d) (2) (iv), F.R. Cr.P. is required to extend the speedy trial time during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal by' the state from an order suppressing evidence. Despite the state’s argument here, it is obvious that the portion of Fla.Stat. § 924.071(2), which provides for an automatic stay during the pendency of such an appeal has been superseded by the provisions of the rule in question which specifically require an order of extension, “. . . for a period of reasonable and necessary delay . for interlocutory appeals . . ..” A contrary ruling would mean that the state could automatically deprive a defendant of the benefits of the Speedy Trial Rule, which did not exist when Fla.Stat. § 924.071(2) was adopted, merely by filing an appeal from an order of suppression and without any judicial determination that the appeal was not frivolous or had not been taken simply for the purpose of securing such a delay. Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge’s order discharging the defendant under Rule 3.191(d)(1). See also State v. Wells, 326 So. 2d 175, at 176 (Fla.1976) (opinion of Hatchett, J.); State v. Wilson, 305 So. 2d 232 (Fla.App.3rd 1974); State v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 415 (Fla.App.2d 1973); Esperti v. State, 276 So. 2d 58 (Fla.App.2nd 1973); State v. Byrne, 331 So. 2d 394 (Fla.App.4th 1976).

AFFIRMED.

WALDEN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
    …, 271 So. 2d 116 (Fla.1972). [*413] Because such an extension for exceptional circumstances must be by order of the court, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(2), and will not be automatic or presumed from the circumstances, State v. Cannon, 332 So. 2d 127 (Fla.4th DCA 1976); Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied 317 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1975); Pouncy v. State, 296 So. 2d 625 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Esperti v. State, 276 So. 2d 58 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied 285 So. 2d 614 (Fla.1973), t…
  • State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1980)
    …al, reported at 349 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The issue concerns the proper application of the existing speedy trial rule1 after an interlocutory appeal has been filed by the state. The instant case relied on the decisions of Cannon v. State, 332 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We find these decisions conflict with State v. Smail, 346 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), and State v. Pearce, 336 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). There is not only irrecon…
  • Tucker v. State, 357 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1978)
    …orders can only be obtained by motion in the trial court, compare State v. Smail, 346 So. 2d 641 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), and State v. Pearce, 336 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1st DCA 1976), with Jenkins v. State, 349 So. 2d 1192 (Fla.4th DCA 1977), State v. Cannon, 332 So. 2d 127 (Fla.4th DCA 1976), and Mullin v. State, 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 761 (Fla.1975), the court below correctly determined that the automatic statutory stay would not be applicable to appeals of pre-trial orders other t…

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