JOHN C. BOSTIC, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bostic was convicted of marijuana possession after a jury trial. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because police officers testified that Bostic invoked his Miranda rights and remained silent after arrest, which was improper and constitutionally harmful error.
The court held that the admission of such testimony is constitutional and fundamental error that does not require a trial objection to preserve the issue on appeal, and that the error was not constitutionally harmless in this case. The testimony was harmful to the defendant's credibility since the jury could infer that if his informant story were true, he would have disclosed it to the arresting officers.
[1] The admission of evidence that a defendant asserted their Miranda rights to remain silent after arrest is an error of constitutional and fundamental dimensions that does…
[2] Evidence that a defendant remained silent after asserting their Miranda rights is constitutionally harmful when the defendant testifies and presents an affirmative defens…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There can be no doubt that the error involving the admission of such testimony is of constitutional and fundamental dimensions, and thus does not require a trial objection to preserve the issue on appeal.”
Establishes that Miranda violation errors do not require trial objection and are preserved automatically for appeal review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBostic was arrested on a marijuana possession charge. After his arrest, he invoked his Miranda rights and made no statement to the arresting police of…
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SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge.
Bostic appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, for the possession of marijuana. We reverse for a new trial because of the erroneous admission of evidence that, after his arrest, the defendant asserted his Miranda rights to remain silent and made no statement to the arresting police officers. Both of the officers in question so testified at the trial. The state, as it must, see Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975), concedes the impropriety of this testimony, but nonetheless argues for affirmance on the interrelated grounds that the defendant admittedly failed to object to the offending testimony below and that the error, if any, was harmless under all the circumstances of the case. We reject both of these contentions.
There can be no doubt that the error involving the admission of such testimony is of constitutional and fundamental dimensions, and thus does not require a trial objection to preserve the issue on appeal. The Third District, in Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla.App.3rd 1967), a decision recently followed and expressly approved by our Supreme Court in Bennett v. State, supra, squarely so held on facts identical to those before us here.
Nor, on the other hand, and even assuming — despite the Supreme Court’s statement in Bennett, at 316 So. 2d 44, that the error “warrants reversal without consideration of the doctrine of harmless error’’ — that the doctrine applies at all to this situation, can the effect of the evidence be deemed constitutionally harmless in this case. At the trial, Bostic took the stand and admitted the possession of the marijuana in question. He claimed, however, that his having done so was merely for the purpose of making a deal for another “more serious” controlled substance in his capacity as a confidential informant for Officer Kelsey of the Orlando Police Department. Kelsey testified for the defendant that Bostic had, in fact, served as a “c.i.” for him in the past. Under these circumstances, the effect upon the jury of the obvious inference that, if this version were true, the defendant would have immediately related it to the arresting officers renders the testimony that he did not do so and chose to remain silent rather plainly harmful to the defendant’s position below. At the very least, “there is a reasonable possibility that it might have contributed to the conviction. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).” Bennett v. State, supra, at 316 So. 2d 44; Acee v. State, 330 So. 2d 496 (Fla.App.4th, Opinion filed April 2, 1976).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WALDEN, C. J„ and CROSS, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (22 total)
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Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)…ALDERMAN, Justice. We have for review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Bostic v. State, 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), which conflict with each other. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Consti…1 / 2
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Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…utes fundamental error (Rule 3.7(i) F.A.R. 31 [32] F.S.A.), or, in a criminal case, when the appellate court deems it to be in the interests of justice that it be reviewed. . . .” Likewise, the court of appeal in Bostic v. State, Fla.App.4th, 1976, 332 So. 2d 349, held that evidence of the defendant’s assertion of his Miranda rights and refusal to make a statement to arresting officers required reversal in spite of the absence of an objection. The court said: “There can be no doubt that the error involving…
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Martin v. State, 334 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…ennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975), at page 44, that any comment upon defendant’s right to remain silent is “of constitutional dimension and warrants reversal without consideration of the doctrine of harmless error.” See also Bostic v. State, 332 So. 2d 349, Fourth District Court of Appeal, opinion filed May 14, 1976; United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed. [*842] 2d 99 (1975); Doyle v. Ohio, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 44 LW 4902 opinion filed June 17, 1976. Moreover,…
Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967)
- Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (U.S. 1969)
- Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (U.S. 1963)
- Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975)
- Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Acee v. State, 330 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)