CHARLES BLAKE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed conviction for drug possession and sale, holding that a defendant's unsolicited letter to the State's Attorney requesting leniency was properly admitted as a party admission and for impeachment despite not being a formal plea discussion.
An unsolicited letter from a defendant to the State's Attorney requesting leniency is admissible as a party admission and for impeachment purposes because it does not constitute a protected plea discussion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.171.
[1] An unsolicited and self-initiated letter from a defendant to the State's Attorney requesting leniency is not protected as a plea discussion under Florida Rule of Criminal…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Please, sir, I hope and pray you will find it in your heart to talk to Judge R. McIntosh to give me one more chance and put me on probation ?”
Statement from Blake's letter to the State's Attorney that was used on cross-examination to impeach his denial of involvement in the crime.
Blake was convicted of possession and sale of a controlled substance. During cross-examination, the prosecution used a statement from a letter Blake h…
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PER CURIAM.
The only substantial question on this appeal from a judgment of guilt and sentence for possession and sale of a controlled substance concerns the use, on cross-examination of the defendant who had denied any involvement with the crime, of the following statement in a letter gratuitously written by Blake to a State’s Attorney:
“Please, sir, I hope and pray you will find it in your heart to talk to Judge R. McIntosh to give me one more chance and put me on probation ?”
We conclude, as did the trial judge, that the statement was properly permitted to be used as a party admission and in impeachment of the defendant’s testimony on direct examination. Ivey v. State, 132 Fla. 36, 180 So. 368, 369 (1938). The letter was not privileged as a “plea discussion” under Rule 3.171, F.R.Cr.P., which provides in part that:
“(a) The Prosecuting Attorney is encouraged to discuss and agree on pleas which may be entered by a defendant. Such discussion and agreement must be conducted with the defendant’s counsel or, if the defendant is unrepresented, may be conducted with defendant.
* * * * *
“(d) Discussion and Agreement Not Admissible. If the defendant pleads not guilty, no mention of any prior proceedings hereunder [emphasis supplied] shall be admissible against him.”
It is apparent that the entirely unsolicited and self-initiated communication from the defendant was not part of a proceeding “under” or contemplated by the rule.
AFFIRMED.
WALDEN, C. J., CROSS, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Stevens v. State, 419 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1982)…hether the state has indicated a willingness to plea-bargain and has in fact solicited the statement in question from the defendant. Unsolicited, unilateral utterances are not statements made in connection with plea negotiations. See Blake v. State, 332 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We conclude that the statement in question was not made in connection with plea negotiations. Although the polygraph examination was arranged so that appellant’s version of the criminal episode could be substantiated and althou…
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Anderson v. State, 420 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1982)…o plead anew in all types of criminal cases. . The state contends that only the prosecuting attorney can negotiate a plea. See 33 Fla.Stat. Ann. rule 3.171, comment, 246 (1975). . Stell v. State, 366 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Blake v. State, 332 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Wright v. State, 309 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d 273 (Fla.1975). . Notwithstanding our holding of inadmissibility of the February and May statements, we disagree with Anderson’s contention that an insuffi…
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Calabro v. State, 995 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2008)…ions, a court should use” the Robertson two-tier analysis. 419 So. 2d at 1062. Moreover, in Stevens, we made it clear that “Unsolicited, unilateral utterances are not statements made in connection with plea negotiations.” Id. (citing Blake v. State, 332 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). The Third District assiduously followed this precedent. It applied the Robertson two-tier test to determine if Calabro’s statements were made in connection with plea negotiations. In doing so, the Third District correctly concl…1 / 2
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- Ivey v. State, 132 Fla. 36 (Fla. 1938)