WILLIAM ARNOLD HUTTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1976-05-28
Nos. AA-150, AA-151 and AA-152
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur.
332 So. 2d 686 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

William Hutton was convicted of receiving stolen property after police recovered $400 worth of tools that he had possessed and given to another person as payment on a debt. The appellate court affirmed his conviction, holding that the state established prima facie evidence of the corpus delicti independent of Hutton's confessional statement to police, thereby permitting its admission at trial.


Holding

The trial court properly admitted Hutton's extra-judicial statement because the state established a prima facie case of the corpus delicti independent of the confession. The state proved that Hutton possessed recently stolen property worth $400 and used it to pay off only a $200 debt, which established guilty knowledge—an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property.


Headnotes

[1] Possession of recently stolen property, when aided by other proof, may establish a prima facie case for receiving stolen property.

[2] A prima facie case for receiving stolen property exists when the state shows possession of recently stolen goods being sold at less than their value.

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Key Quotes

“There can be no doubt that an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property knowing same to have been stolen is knowledge by the accused that at the time he received the property it was stolen, or knowledge of such fact as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and caution in inquiry.”

Establishes the essential knowledge requirement for the crime of receiving stolen property

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Facts & Procedural History

Approximately $400 worth of tools were stolen from G & P Auto Parts in early July 1975. Shortly thereafter, Hutton was found in possession of these st…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property, contrary to Florida Statute 811.16(1973).

Following the presentation of the foregoing evidence, the state sought to introduce a statement given by appellant to the police after his arrest. In that statement, appellant explained that he had noticed the tools lying under a palm tree near G & P Auto Parts while on his way to play tennis. He hid them in an old warehouse. He proceeded to play tennis and then went home. Later, he returned and took possession of the tools until giving them to Mr. Harris.

Appellant’s counsel strongly objected to the introduction of the foregoing statement, contending it was not admissible because the state had failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime for which appellant was charged. The objection was overruled, and the statement was presented to the jury. The state rested its case; the appellant presented no evidence, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

There can be no doubt that an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property knowing same to have been stolen is knowledge by the accused that at the time he received the property it was stolen, or knowledge of such fact as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and caution in inquiry.2 This requirement of knowledge by the accused may not be shown merely by proof of possession of recently stolen property, not aided by othei proof.3

Appellant correctly aserts that an extra-judicial confession should not be admitted unless the corpus delicti of the crime is established by prima facie evidence independent of the confession.4 The question arises of whether the state presented a prima facie case without the presentation of appellant’s extra-judicial statement to the police. As stated, part of the corpus delicti of the crime herein is guilty knowledge. The state, independent of that statement, showed that appellant was in possession of $400.00 worth of recently stolen goods which he used to pay off a $200.00 debt; thus, the goods were being sold at less than their value.5 This fact established a prima facie case and thus permitted introduction of the extrajudicial statement.

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.

RAWLS, Acting C. J., and MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur. .As a result of this conviction, appellant’s probation was revoked and he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced in two other cases. Appeals were filed in all three cases, and all were consolidated into one cause.

. Seymour v. State, 246 So. 2d 155 (3 Fla.App.1971), cert. den. 250 So. 2d 641 (Fla.1971).

. Graham v. State, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1970).

. Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939); McQueen v. State, 304 So. 2d 501 (4 Fla.App.1974), cert. den. 315 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1975).

. Graham v. State, supra.

Footnotes
1 At trial, the state presented evidence which tended to show that a number of tools worth about $400.00 were stolen from G & P Auto Parts sometime during the first week of July, 1975. There was also evidence which tended to show that the appellant was shortly thereafter in possession of the stolen tools, for he had given them to one Obie Harris as payment on a $200.-00 debt. A police officer recovered the tools from Mr. Harris on July 15,1975.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Newberry v. State, 442 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
    …him about their authority and the source of the pipe. Thus, says the state, there was “direct evidence of taking, selling, and evasion (guilty knowledge).” Part of the corpus delecti of the crime charged herein is guilty knowledge. Hutton v. State, 332 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The state’s parenthetical assertion in its brief that the stacked pipe was not on the road right-of-way is contradicted by its own evidence at trial, the testimony of the field superintendent, one Ervin Vancise. The latter test…
  • Moore v. State, 530 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
  • Nelson v. State, 372 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
    …nd “admission” in referring to extrajudicial inculpatory statements. This imprecise use of language has caused difficulties. The clearest type of case is where a statement is made to police that is clearly a “confession.” See, e. g, Hutton v. State, 332 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Kirsner v. State, 308 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). A more difficult group of cases are those in which the extrajudicial statement is clearly in the nature of a “confession,” but is made to a layman as opposed to a policeman. S…

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