RODNEY TIM SHAW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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This case addresses when the 180-day speedy trial period begins for a defendant initially detained as a juvenile who is subsequently waived to criminal court. The court holds that the speedy trial clock begins running from the date of initial custody, regardless of juvenile status.
The speedy trial period begins running from the date of initial custody, not from the date of waiver to criminal court. A defendant detained as a juvenile is entitled to either juvenile or adult speedy trial protection from the date of detention, and the count begins immediately regardless of which system ultimately applies.
[1] The speedy trial period for an accused initially taken into custody as a juvenile begins to run on the date of initial custody, even if juvenile jurisdiction is later wai…
[2] When a juvenile speedy trial rule and an adult speedy trial rule are both effective, the accused is entitled to count the days of the adult speedy trial rule beginning on…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It follows that Shaw became entitled on that day to a speedy trial either as prescribed for juveniles by Rule 8.120, R.J.P., or as prescribed for adults by Rule 3.191, R.Cr.P., depending on whether he ultimately was to be tried as a juvenile or as an adult. In either case, the count began when custody began.”
Establishes that the speedy trial period begins from initial custody regardless of eventual jurisdiction
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShaw was detained as a juvenile on October 24, 1974. Juvenile jurisdiction was waived on November 8, 1974, and he was held to answer in criminal court…
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SMITH, Judge.
Shaw’s appeal presents the question of when the 180-day speedy trial period prescribed by Rule 3.191, R.Cr.P., begins to run for an accused who is initially taken into custody as a juvenile. Shaw was detained as a juvenile on October 24, 1974; juvenile jurisdiction was waived and he was held to answer in the criminal department of the circuit court on November 8, 1974; following denial of his Rule 3.191 motion for discharge, Shaw was tried and convicted of robbery on April 25, 1975, 183 days after he was taken into custody and 168 days after being waived out of the juvenile system. No extension of the period for speedy trial was sought or granted. There is no contention that any part of the delay is assessable to Shaw.
Shaw’s position is correct. When dealing with a juvenile who was taken into custody before the juvenile speedy trial rule became effective, the Supreme Court held that the accused who was tried as an adult became entitled to count the days of the adult speedy trial rule beginning on the date the juvenile speedy trial rule became effective, although that was before juvenile jurisdiction was waived. State v. Boatman, 329 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1976).
Both rules were effective on the day Shaw was detained. It follows that Shaw became entitled on that day to a speedy trial either as prescribed for juveniles by Rule 8.120, R.J.P., or as prescribed for adults by Rule 3.191, R.Cr.P., depending on whether he ultimately was to be tried as a juvenile or as an adult. In either case, the count began when custody began. In the absence of delay by Shaw or a timely order extending the time for trial, Rule 3.191(d)(2), (f), R.Cr.P., Shaw was entitled to be discharged. Our decision in State v. Bryant, 276 So. 2d 184 (Fla.App. 1st, 1973), is no longer viable. Boatman, supra, 329 So. 2d at 313. To the extent that my January 1976 opinion for the Court in McCraw v. State, 330 So. 2d 48 (Fla.App. 1st, 1976), contains nondispositive language which is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s March decision in Boatman, we of course recede from it.
REVERSED.
MILLS, Acting C. J., and AGNER, ROYCE, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Broadhurst v. The Honorable Norton Josephson, 340 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)…Upon considering the briefs, the record and oral argument, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the order appealed is affirmed on authority of State v. Hendricks, 309 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Shaw v. State, 332 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), is distinguishable and not applicable to the facts in this case. BOYER, C. J., and MILLS and McCORD, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Woody Lee Gray, 370 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…juvenile who has been certified to be tried as an adult is entitled under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 to be brought to trial within 180 days from the time he was initially taken into custody. Accord, State v. Hunter, 342 So. 2d 81 (Fla.1977); Shaw v. State, 332 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Under Benton, supra, the 180 day speedy trial period commenced herein on July 18, 1977, the date Gray was taken into custody. However, Benton, supra, is distinguishable from the present case since therein there was no waiver of…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Gaylon E. Boatman, 329 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1976)
- State v. Arnett Bryant, 276 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Olin Dorsey v. State, 276 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- McCRAW v. State, 330 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)