JOHNNIE IVEY WILSON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE (STATE)

Citator

Cited By

• Berry v. State, 345 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
  …indispensable element of the crime of obtaining property in return for a worthless check. This court has previously held that failure to give this additional instruction is fundamental error, the gravity of which requires reversal. Prince v. State, 333 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). On the authority of oúr holding in Prince, we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand this case for a new trial. . Because of the conflict which exists between our holding and the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Crimina…
• Isham W. Adams, Jr. v. State, 356 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
  …giving that dictum effect, have read intent to defraud into the statutory elements notwithstanding that the present statute omits reference to an intent to defraud but explicitly excepts innocent transactions of a certain character. Prince v. State, 333 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Bailer v. State, 337 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Berry v. State, 345 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We believe, to the contrary, that the Supreme Court silently retracted the Anderson dictum in Ennis v. State, 95 So. 2d 20…

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• State v. Berry, 358 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1978)
  …te’s description, did not list “intent to defraud” as an element. Berry was convicted and appealed, raising as fundamental error the failure to charge the jury on “intent to defraud.” The district court reversed on the authority of Prince v. State, 333 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In that case the court had held fraudulent intent to be an element of the offense in reliance on Anderson v. Bryson, 94 Fla. 1165, 115 So. 505 (1927). Anderson, however, construed not the present statute, but its predecessor,5 l…

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