EX PARTE GEORGE L. SULLIVAN
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In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner Sullivan sought to overturn his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence on the ground that one juror was disqualified as a deputy sheriff. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that challenges for cause must be raised before a juror is sworn, and failure to do so results in waiver of the objection.
The court held that although being a deputy sheriff is a legal disqualification for jury duty and grounds for a challenge for cause, a verdict and judgment are not void based on this disqualification. The right to challenge for cause must be exercised before the juror is sworn, or it is lost and considered waived.
“The fact of being a deputy sheriff is a legal disqualification for jury duty, Section 40.07, Florida Statutes 1941, but. if one of the jurors in this case was in fact a deputy sheriff, (a question in dispute that we are not required to decide) the verdict and judgment are not void.”
Establishes that disqualification status alone does not void a verdict
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeorge L. Sullivan was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. After his conviction was affirmed and his petition for writ of …
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This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner seeks to avoid a judgment of murder in the first, degree wherein the extreme penalty was imposed on him. It is contended that the judgment is void because one of the jurors who rendered the verdict was disqualified because of being a deputy sheriff and that this fact was not known to petitioner until months after his conviction.
The judgment imposing the death penalty was affirmed by this Court, petition for rehearing was denied, and petition for leave to file a writ of error coram nobis was denied May 26, 1944. The latter was predicated on the same ground as the present petition for habeas corpus. The fact of being a deputy sheriff is a legal disqualification for jury duty, Section 40.07, Florida Statutes 1941, but. if one of the jurors in this case was in fact a deputy sheriff, (a question in dispute that we are not required to decide) the verdict and judgment are not void.
The fact of being a deputy sheriff is a ground of challenge for cause, Section 913.03, Florida Statutes 1941, but if the right to challenge for cause is not exercised before the juror is sworn to try the cause it is lost, Section 913.04, Florida Statutes 1941. If one of the jurors was in fact a deputy sheriff, it was a matter of record available to the petitioner at the trial and should have been seasonably raised. He should have been challenged for cause and exception taken on refusal of the challenge. The challenged error could have then been reviewed on appeal.
We have examined Scott v. State, 70 Miss. 247, 11 So. 657, and other cases relied on by petitioner but they present different factual situations that differentiate them from the case at bar. When the statute fixes the grounds of challenge for cause and the limit under which they may be exercised, if not so exercised, they will be considered as waived. To hold *113otherwise would render trials interminable and impose an undue burden on the taxpayer.
Petitioner does not allege that the juror in question was biased or prejudiced or that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial. His petition is based on grounds that might have been available on appeal but cannot be reached on habeas corpus.
The petition is therefore denied.
BUFORD, C. J., CHAPMAN, THOMAS, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
BROWN, J., concurs in conclusion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1961)…h reference to the failure of the juror to be a registered voter. The appellants make no contention that they were not fairly heard with an unprejudiced mind by the jurors in question. Their position offers no ground for reversal. Ex parte Sullivan, 155 Fla. 111, 19 So. 2d 611; Burns v. State, 89 Fla. 353, 104 So. 447; Section 913.04, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; 31 Am.Jur. “Jury” Sections 154-156. The final contention relied upon by the appellants is that the Court failed to instruct the jury to the effect t…
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Everett v. State, 97 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1957)…by Section 40.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., at the time he qualified and sat as a juror in the case at bar, since the prosecution against him had been dropped! for almost twenty years. Likens v. State, 153 Fla. 887, 16 So. 2d 158; Ex parte Sullivan, 155 Fla. 111, 19 So. 2d 611. Questions XI and XII charge that the trial court committed error in refusing a new trial on the ground (1) that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (2) the juror Henry C. Corbin was a judicially declared incompet…
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Hoyt v. State, 119 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1959)…on v. Jordan, 101 Fla. 616, 135 So. 138. Cf. State v. Walters, 61 Idaho 341, 102 P. 2d 284. . See Warner v. State, Fla., 84 So. 2d 314. . Ibid. . F.S. Sec. 918.10(4), F.S.A. Brunke v. State, 100 Fla. 43, 33 So. 2d 226. See also Ex parte Sullivan, 155 Fla. 111, 19 So. 2d 611.…
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