JEREMY COLEMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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WALDEN, Chief Judge.
Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to possession of marijuana, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. We reverse.
The Stop and Frisk Statute, Fla.Stat. § 901.151(2) (1975), provides there must be circumstances which reasonably indicate to the policeman that a person has committed, is committing, or is going to commit a crime. We carefully have reviewed the re.cord on appeal and the testimony and, based thereon, we hold the facts-surrounding the defendant’s detention merely constitute bare suspicion and, therefore, are insufficient to support a stop and frisk, Stanley v. State, 327 So. 2d 243 (Fla.App., 2d 1976); Richardson v. State, 291 So. 2d 253 (Fla.App., 1st 1974).
We reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CROSS, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (21 total)
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State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…ch has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge. “Mere” or “bare” suspicion, on the other hand, cannot support detention. Coleman v. State, 333 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Mere suspicion is no better than random selection, sheer guesswork, or hunch, and has no objective justification. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Thomas v. State, 250 So. 2d 15 (Fla.1st D…
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Am. Motors Corp. & Jeep Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…effective. See, e.g., AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla.1975); Gordon v. John Deere Co., 264 So. 2d 419 (Fla.1972); Weatherhead Co. v. Coletti, 392 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), approved, 409 So. 2d 1026 (Fla.1982); Griffis v. J.C. Penny Co., 333 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Knaser v. Smith, 323 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Ray Walker & Associates v. Jay Caponey, Inc., 320 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 308 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Barton v. Keyes C…
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Sumlin v. State, 433 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…State, 337 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 427 (Fla.1977); § 901.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1981). A “mere” or “bare” suspicion will not suffice. In the Interest of R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Coleman v. State, 333 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.1976). Several factors are relevant in considering a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO: the length of time and distance from the offense; route of flight; specificity of the description of the vehicl…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stanley v. State, 327 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Richardson v. State, 291 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)