LEONARD E. ZEDECK, APPELLANT,
v.
MARCIA ZEDECK, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, Leonard Zedeck appeals the denial of his motion for protective order that would have prevented his ex-wife from discovering his financial records. The court reversed, holding that because Marcia was fully aware of Leonard's finances when she signed the settlement agreement, she cannot use discovery of his subsequent income increase to modify the agreement absent fraud, duress, or similar misconduct.
A party seeking to modify a settlement agreement in a dissolution action must allege and prove fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching—not merely a change in circumstances. Because Marcia was fully aware of Leonard's financial status when she signed the agreement, discovery into his financial records to support a modification based on subsequent income increase is improper and the protective order should have been granted.
[1] A party seeking to modify or set aside a separation and property settlement agreement must allege and prove fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching.
[2] A substantial increase in a party's income subsequent to the execution of a property settlement agreement is insufficient grounds to modify the agreement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to have this agreement modified or set aside, Marcia must allege and prove fraud, duress, deceit, coercion or overreaching on the part of Leonard in obtaining the agreement.”
Establishes the legal standard required to modify a settlement agreement in a dissolution case—something beyond mere change in circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeonard and Marcia executed a separation and property settlement agreement on July 30, 1974, that resolved all financial matters between them. Leonard…
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PER CURIAM.
Leonard Zedeck appeals the denial of his motion for protective order in this action for dissolution of marriage.
On July 30, 1974 the parties executed a separation and property settlement agree ment resolving all financial matters between them, which agreement was to be incorporated into a dissolution of marriage judgment. Subsequently Leonard’s wife, Marcia, filed a petition for dissolution and prayed that the alimony provisions of the agreement be modified on the ground that Leonard’s income substantially increased from $58,401 in 1973 to $91,981 in 1974. She served Leonard with a notice of taking deposition and request for production of his personal books and records for the years 1972, 1973 and 1974, including all savings and passbooks, stocks, bonds, profit sharing statements, etc. Leonard filed a motion for protective order and argued that the allegations concerning his financial status are totally irrelevant since he has paid and Marcia has accepted substantial sums under the terms of the property settlement and she is bound by the agreement. The chancellor denied the motion and this appeal ensued.
As revealed from his income tax returns and financial statements, Marcia was fully aware of Leonard’s financial worth at the time of the execution of the separation and property settlement agreement. In order to have this agreement modified or set aside, Marcia must allege and prove fraud, duress, deceit, coercion or overreaching on the part of Leonard in obtaining the agreement. See Haynes v. Haynes, Fla. 1954, 71 So. 2d 491; Cowen v. Cowen, Fla.1957, 95 So. 2d 584; Sedell v. Sedell, Fla.App.1958, 100 So. 2d 639. Marcia merely alleges a change in circumstances by virtue of a substantial increase in Leonard’s income subsequent to the time she entered into the agreement which is insufficient grounds for modification. See Haynes, supra; Markham v. Markham, Fla.App.1969, 222 So. 2d 759; Gilbert v. Gilbert, Fla.App.1975, 312 So. 2d 511.
The order denying Leonard’s motion for protective order and allowing Marcia to take Leonard’s deposition with respect to his financial status is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Before concluding, we wish to point out that Marcia may depose Leonard with respect to any other relevant matter not resolved by the separation and property settlement agreement.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…(Fla. 1st DCA 1971). To modify or set aside a property settlement agreement, it is incumbent upon the party seeking to abrogate the agreement to allege and prove fraud, duress, deceit, coercion or overreaching by the other party. Zedeck v. Zedeck, 334 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Case law suggests two methods, one direct and one indirect. The direct method involves affirmative proof of fraud, misstatements, deceit, etc. The indirect method allows the party seeking to [*467] invalidate a property settlemen…
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Powell v. Powell, 386 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…able to pay . such additional reasonable alimony” as may be directed by the court, thereby admitting that his ability to pay had also increased.4 But he argues that this fact likewise cannot support the order under review. He cites Zedeck v. Zedeck, 334 So. 2d 87 (Fla.3d DCA 1976) for this proposition.5 As a result of our conclusion that the order must be sustained on the basis of the material increase [*1216] in the wife’s needs alone, we need not rule directly upon this argument, beyond noting that the sti…1 / 2
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Cronacher v. Cronacher, 508 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…Fla. [2nd] DCA 1974). To modify or set aside a property settlement agreement, it is incumbent upon the party seeking to abrogate the agreement to allege and prove fraud, duress, deceit, coercion or overreaching by the other party. Zedeck v. Zedeck, 334 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). Case law suggests two methods, one direct and one indirect. The direct method involves affirmative proof of fraud, misstatements, deceit, etc. The indirect method allows the party seeking to invalidate a property settlement agre…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Maxine Florence Sedell (now Maxine Sedell White) v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Isabel M. Cowen (Papert) v. Cowen, 95 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1957)
- Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1954)
- Gilbert v. Gilbert, 312 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Markham v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)