SCHNEIDER
v.
COHAN ET AL.
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The Florida Supreme Court held that the sixty-day period for filing an appeal from a summary judgment begins from the date the judgment is actually entered in the circuit court's minute book, not from the date it is signed, filed with the clerk, or noted in the progress docket. The Court therefore denied the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely.
The time for appeal begins to run from the effective day of the judgment, which is the day it is actually recorded in the Circuit Court minute book. The dates of signing, filing with the clerk, or notation in the progress docket are immaterial for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was therefore denied.
“The time begins to run from the effective day of the judgment and that is the day it is actually entered, that is to say, recorded, in the Circuit Court minute book.”
Establishes the governing rule that entry in the minute book, not filing or signing, marks the start of the sixty-day appeal period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA summary judgment was dated and filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County on February 11, 1954, and noted in the Progress Docket on th…
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DREW, Justice.
A motion has been made to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal which was filed April 15, 1954 was not filed within sixty days after the entry of the summary judgment appealed from.
The record before us shows that the summary judgment appealed from was dated February 11; 1954, was filed in the office of the Qerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County on the 11th day of February 1954, and its filing with the Clerk was noted in the Progress Docket on February 11, 1954. The record further shows, however, that such summary judgment was not recorded in the minutes of the Circuit Court until the 15th day of February 1954. 'An appeal from a final judgment at law must be taken “within sixty days from and after the entry of the * * * judgment * * * appealed from.” Sec. 59.08, F.S.1951, F.S.A. So far as appellate jurisdiction is concerned, the date of the signing of the judgment by the Circuit Judge or the date the same is filed in the Clerk’s office or the date the same is noted in the Progress Docket is of no consequence. The time begins to run from the effective day of the judgment and that is the day it is actually entered, that is to say, recorded, in the Circuit Court minute book. See Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Luke, 156 Fla. 638, 24 So. 2d 310, 311. The same rule applies to appeals from final decrees in Chancery, the only difference being that Chancery decrees are required to be entered, that is, recorded, in the Chancery Order Book. See Magnant v. Peacock, 156 Fla. 688, 24 So. 2d 314, 315, and the cases there cited; Barry v. Robson, Fla.1953, 65 So. 2d 739, 740. Compare, as to writs of certiorari in compensation cases, American Airmotive Corporation v. Stutz, Fla., 72 So. 2d 665.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
ROBERTS, C. J., and HOBSON and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Rolf Peter Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1958)…decree appealed from.” Section 59.08, F.S.A.1955. We have held in numerous cases that the recording of the final decree in a chancery case constitutes “entry” from which the time for taking the appeal begins to run. In Schneider v. Cohan, Fla.1954, 73 So. 2d 69, 70, we said: “An appeal from a final judgment at law must be taken ‘within sixty days from and after the entry of the * * * judgment * * * appealed from.’ Sec. 59.08, F.S.1951, F.S.A. So far as appellate jurisdiction is concerned, the date of the…1 / 2
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Berkenfield v. Jacobs, 83 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1955)…xpressions by this court which indicate that a decree is effective only when it is recorded, but our study of these decisions has not revealed a situation even approaching the one with which we are dealing. For instance, in Schneider v. Cohan, Fla., 73 So. 2d 69, Magnant v. Peacock, 156 Fla. 688, 24 So. 2d 314, we were considering the effective date of final decrees as bases for the computation of the time within which appeals could be taken; in three cases already cited, Wilmott v. Equitable Building & Loa…
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Barnett v. Barnett, 743 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…make the decree ineffective for any purpose. See id. at 267-68. The court distinguished the case from oth [*107] er cases where it had used language indicating that a decree is effective only when recorded; among these cases were Schneider v. Cohan, 73 So. 2d 69 (Fla.1954), and Magnant v. Peacock, 156 Fla. 688, 24 So. 2d 314 (1945), where the court was “considering the effective date of final decrees as bases for the computation of the time within which appeals could be taken.” Berkenfield, 83 So. 2d at 268…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Luke, 156 Fla. 638 (Fla. 1945)
- Magnant v. Peacock, 156 Fla. 688 (Fla. 1945)
- Barry v. Robson, 65 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1953)
- Am. Airmotive Corp. v. Stutz, 72 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1954)