STATE FARM AND CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ZIGMAS SAURAZAS, APPELLEE
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State Farm challenges a summary judgment in favor of Saurazas in an insurance coverage dispute. The court reversed, holding that collateral estoppel prevented the trial court from re-litigating whether Saurazas's assault and battery against a third party was intentional, since a jury had already resolved that issue in the underlying tort case.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Collateral estoppel barred the trial court from re-litigating whether the assault and battery was intentional, as a jury in the prior suit had already resolved that issue. Because the assault and battery was an intentional tort not covered by the policy, summary judgment should have been entered for the insurer.
[1] An insurance policy that excludes coverage for intentional torts does not cover claims for assault and battery.
[2] A jury's verdict awarding only compensatory damages for assault and battery does not preclude the act from being considered an intentional tort.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is our view that this issue was resolved by the jury in the suit between Snyder and appel-lee and that the trial court was thereafter precluded on the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating an issue actually adjudicated in the prior litigation.”
States the core holding applying collateral estoppel to bar re-litigation of the intentional nature of the tort.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceState Farm issued Saurazas a liability insurance policy excluding intentional tort coverage. A third party, Snyder, sued Saurazas for assault and batt…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal State Farm and Casualty Company, appellant, alleges the trial court erred as a matter of law in entering summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Zigmas Saurazas. We agree and reverse with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellant-defendant.
The record reflects the absence of any disputed facts. Appellant had issued a policy of insurance to appellee providing coverage for bodily and personal injury and property damage liability. One Snyder filed suit against appellee claiming that while on the premises of appellee he suffered bodily injuries alleged to have been inflicted by the appellee. Count One of Snyder’s complaint alleged the tort of as sault and battery seeking compensatory and punitive damages and Count Two alleged negligence on the part of the appellee. The appellant, pursuant to a reservation of rights, defended appellee; a directed verdict was granted for appellee on the issue of negligence but denied on the issue of assault and battery. The latter issue went to the jury which returned a verdict against appellee and in favor of Snyder for compensatory damages but denying Snyder any punitive damages.
It is clear from a reading of the policy in question that coverage did not include intentional torts. When the issue of coverage was heard subsequent to the entry of judgment in favor of Snyder the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the appellee concluding, in effect, that the appellee’s act (of assault and battery) was not an intentional act. It is our view that this issue was resolved by the jury in the suit between Snyder and appel-lee and that the trial court was thereafter precluded on the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating an issue actually adjudicated in the prior litigation. Cf. Seaboard Coast L.
R. Co, v. Industrial Contracting Co., 260 So. 2d 860 (Fla.App. 4th 1972). The only issue before the jury in the proceedings between Snyder and appellee was Count One of Snyder’s complaint relating to assault and battery which is considered an intentional tort, McDonald v. Ford, 223 So. 2d 553 (Fla. App.2d 1969), and the jury was so charged on this issue. The fact that the jury awarded Snyder compensatory damages only and did not award punitive damages does not prevent assault and battery from constituting an intentional tort. See Wrains v. Rose, 175 So. 2d 75 (Fla.App.2d 1965); Holland v. Glass, 213 So. 2d 320 (Fla.App.4th 1968); see also Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So. 2d 291 (Fla.App.3d 1971).
Therefore, an intentional tort of assault and battery being the only issue submitted to and resolved by the jury for which appellant’s policy of insurance did not provide coverage, it was error to enter summary judgment in favor of appellee. Accordingly, the summary final judgment entered in favor of appellee is vacated and set aside and the cause remanded to the trial court with the respectful direction to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CROSS and MAGER, JJ., and KEOUGH, LAWRENCE E., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hartford Fire Ins. Co. & St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…held to be an intentional tort which is not covered by insurance policies which insure against an “accident.” Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ivy Liquors, Inc. 185 So. 2d 187 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1966). See also State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Saurazas, 334 So. 2d 180 (Fla.4th D.C.A. 1976); Capoferri v. Allstate Insurance Co., 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1975); Buchwald v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 319 So. 2d 164 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1975). In the instant case, the insured Donald Spreen committed an assault…
Authorities Cited
- Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Indus. Contracting Co., Inc., 260 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Wrains v. Rose, 175 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- McDONALD v. Ford, 223 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Lilyan Holland v. Henriette P. Glass, 213 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)