CITY OF MIAMI BEACH
v.
TRAINA
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a mandamus order requiring the City of Miami Beach to issue a retail vendor's liquor license for a Service Bar restaurant. The Court held that special legislative acts granted the City authority to regulate the method of sale of alcoholic beverages through Service Bars, distinguishing this case from its prior Simpson v. Goldworm decision where such authority was not properly presented.
The City had authority to regulate the method of sale through Service Bars, as granted by special legislative acts (Chapters 24710 of 1947 and 26032 of 1949). The appellee was entitled to the liquor license because his restaurant and Service Bar complied with all Code requirements, and the lower court properly considered the special legislative authority that was not properly presented in the prior Simpson case.
“in the absence of special legislative authority, the City of Miami Beach could not regulate the method of sale of intoxicating liquors by providing for the sale thereof from Service Bars only”
States the holding of Simpson v. Goldworm that was distinguished in this case
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTraina sought a retail vendor's liquor license to operate a Service Bar in connection with his restaurant in Miami Beach. The City denied the license,…
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ROBERTS, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Dade County entered in mandamus proceedings filed by the appel-lee, Traina, against the appellant, the City of Miami Beach.
By his suit, the appellee sought to compel the City to issue to him a retail vendor’s liquor license to operate a Service Bar in connection with his restaurant. The alternative writ issued, as prayed. In its Return thereto, the City alleged that the number of unrestricted retail vendor’s liquor licenses authorized by its Code on the basis of population, had already been issued; that it was without authority to restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to Service Bars only under the decision of this court in Simpson v. Goldworm, Fla., 59 So. 2d 511, and that, unless the Service Bar limitation was imposed, the City could not issue the license requested by appellee, as to do so would exceed the quota prescribed ’by its Code. The lower court held that the appellee’was entitled to the issuance of the license and entered a peremptory writ requiring the City to do so. This appeal followed.
Of prime importance in the instant case are the allegations in the City’s Return to the Alternative Writ that the provisions of its ordinances providing for the sale of alcoholic beverages from Service Bars and requiring that licenses issued for such sales should bé excluded in computing the number of retail vendor liquor licenses authorized to be issued in accordance with the population requirements of its Code, Chapter 15, Article “I” of the Code of the City of Miami Beach, 1950, were “specifically authorized by the Legislature;” as well as the statement in its brief that “These ordinances were adopted pursuant to Chapter 24710, Special Acts of 1947, as amended by Chapter 26032, Special Acts, 1949.” It should also be noted that the City admitted in its Return that the restaurant and Service Bar for which the appellee sought a liquor license complied with the requirements of its Code respecting sales from Service Bars. But, as noted above, it contended that the opinion of this court in Simpson v. Goldworm, supra, 59 So. 2d 511 precluded a compliance with appel-lee’s request.
In Simpson v. Goldworm, we were concerned with an appeal from a judgment in habeas corpus proceedings in which the. appellee attacked the validity of the ordinances here in question, for a violation of' which he was restrained of. his liberty; and we affirmed the judgment of the lower court in holding, under the authority of City of Miami v. Kichinko, 156 Fla. 128, 22 So. 2d 627, that in the absence of special legislative authority, the City of Miami Beach could not regulate the method of - sale of intoxicating liquors by providing for the sale thereof from Service Bars only; and that since there was no showing of such specific authority, the holder of a valid state license to sell intoxicating liquor at-retail could not be limited to sales from Service Bars only. Such decision was correct on the state of the record, as it was made here and in the , lower court, since, in that case the Special Acts above referred to, Chapters 24710, Special Acts 1947, and 26032, Special Acts 1949, were not presented to the lower court and were not considered by it in its determination of the question of the validity of the ordinance; they were nowhere mentioned in the briefs filed in this court on the main appeal from the judgment in that case; and it was not until a petition for rehearing was filed in this court that the City strongly urged that the Special Acts above referred to were authority for the enactment by the City of the ordinances in question. In accordance with the settled rule of this court, we declined to hold the lower court in' error on a question which was not presented to it and as to which it had made no determination, and which was injected into the case for the first time on appeal.
In the instant case, the situation is entirely different, as has been shown. The lower court had the right to find that the Special Acts, Chapters 24710 and 26032, supra, by necessary implication, if not expressly, granted to the City the right to regulate the method of sale of alcoholic beverages from Service Bars, despite our holding in the Simpson case, in which the question of the force of such Special Acts was not properly presented and was not, therefore, decided. This being so, and the appellee having shown that his restaurant and Service Bar came within the provisions of the ordinances in question, he was entitled to the license applied for and' it was the duty of the City to issue it to him. The peremptory writ requiring the City to do was not, therefore, error. For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from should be and it is" hereby
Affirmed.
TERRELL, SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
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City OF Wilton Manors v. Starling, 121 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)…s authorized to restrict vendors in ■the class of Goldworm to sales from “service bars” only, the provisions of the Miami Beach ordinance attempting to do so were invalid and of no effect. The Court noted in City of Miami Beach v. Traina, Fla.1954, 73 So. 2d 860, that its "holding in Simpson v. Goldworm, supra, was correct on the state of that record. But since, in the Traína case, the city made .a showing that Special Acts 1947, ch. 24710 .as amended Special Acts 1949, ch. 26032, gave it, by necessary impl…
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Zundell v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 609 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…le is firmly established that a prior decision has no prece-dential effect in a later case as to any question not raised and not considered in the earlier opinion. In re Blankenship’s Estate, 122 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1960); City of Miami Beach v. Traina, 73 So. 2d 860 (Fla.1954); City of Miami v. Stegemann, 158 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Thus, although the Victor Wine rule may have been applied in other cases in which the facts do not reveal whether the employee suffered from a preexisting condition, such cas…
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DOE v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 614 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ule is firmly established that a prior decision has no precedential effect in a later case as to any question not raised and not considered in the earlier opinion. In re Blankenship’s Estate, 122 So. 2d 466 (Fla.1960); City of Miami Beach v. Traina, 73 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1954); City of Miami v. Stegemann, 158 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Finally, I note that the supreme court has never receded from its holding in Diamond, and, until it does, an appellate district court is without the power to overrule contr…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City of Miami v. Kichinko, 156 Fla. 128 (Fla. 1945)
- Simpson v. Goldworm, 59 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1952)
- Eisenberg v. Cornblum, 156 Fla. 87 (Fla. 1945)