ENGLEWOOD WATER DISTRICT, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
J. D. TATE ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that Englewood was granted the power to regulate sewers and water supply under Section 4(e) and to require consent for sewage plants under Section 25 upon ratification of the act, without a separate election for Section 4(e)'s regulatory powers.
[1] A statute's history, the evil it seeks to correct, the legislature's intention, the subject regulated, and the object to be obtained are all relevant in statutory constru…
[2] When a statute's language is clear and unmistakable, courts must give effect to the legislature's intent without resorting to rules of construction.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEnglewood appealed a declaratory judgment construing its powers under a special act. The act contained sections granting powers to regulate water/sewe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ratification Of Acts cases and more on FLexlaw
HOBSON, Judge.
Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Englewood, appeals a final declaratory judgment construing the powers of Engle-wood under Chapter 59-931, Laws of Florida. The two pertinent sections of Chapter 59-931 are:
“Section 4. The district by and through the board, is hereby authorized and empowered:
iji * * # * *
(e) To regulate the use of sewers and the supply of water within the district and to prohibit the use and maintenance of out-houses, privies, septic tanks or other unsanitary structures or appliances, provided, however, that such authority and power shall have been approved at an election of the qualified electors residing in said district,. called for the specific purpose of obtaining such approval, such election to be held in accordance with the general laws of the state of Florida.”
* * * * * *
“Section 25. No sewage disposal plant or other facilities for the collection and treatment of sewage, or any water treatment plant or other facilities for the supply and distribution of water, shall be constructed within the district unless the board shall give its consent thereto and approve the plans and specifications therefor; subject, however, to the terms and provisions of any resolution authorizing any bonds and agreements with bondholders.”
It is conceded that the election under Section 4(e) was not held. It is also conceded that the election required by the act to ratify Chapter 59-931 was held and the act was ratified.
The trial court held that the construction of a sewage disposal plant falls under the power to regulate the use of sewers granted under Section 4(e) and since an election was not held under Section 4(e), Engle-wood had no powers under Section 25.
Englewood contends that Section 4(e) and Section 25 are clear and unambiguous and do not conflict with one another. Englewood reasons that under Section 4(e) there are two powers granted it: 1) to regulate the use of sewers and the supply of water within the district, and 2) to prohibit the use and maintenance of outhouses, privies, septic tanks or other unsanitary structures or appliances. It further reasons that the election called for under Section 4(e) applies only to the second power to prohibit and that the ratification of the act gave it the power to regulate the use of sewers and the supply of water without an election under Section 4(e). Englewood also contends that the ratification of the act granted it all powers under Section 25.
It is well settled that in construing a statute the court should consider its history, evil to be corrected, the intention of the law-making body, subject regulated and the object to be obtained. Smith v. Ryan, Fla.1949, 39 So. 2d 281. It is also a rule of statutory construction that it is the duty of the court to examine the statute as a whole in order to determine its meaning and if the intent of the legislature is clear and unmistakable from the language used, it is the court’s duty to give effect to that intent. Rules of statutory construction should be used only in case of doubt and should never be used to create doubt, only to remove it. State v. Egan, Fla.1973, 287 So. 2d 1, and Scenic Hills Utility Company v. City of Pensacola, Fla.App.1st 1963, 156 So. 2d 874. It was held in State v. Sullivan, 1928, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, at page 261:
“ . . . In statutory construction legislative intent is the pole star by which we must be guided, and this intent must be given effect even though it may appear to contradict the strict letter of the statute and well-settled canons of construction. The primary purpose designated should determine the force and effect of the words used in the act, and no literal interpretation should be given that lends to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion or a purpose not designed by the lawmakers.”
Considering all of the elements set forth above, and particularly the intention of the legislature, we hold that upon ratification of the act Englewood was granted the powers to require its consent and approval of the plans and specifications for the construction of a sewage disposal plant under Section 25 of the act. It also was granted upon ratification of the act the power to regulate the use of sewers and the supply of water within its district under Section 4(e) of the act without approval at a separate election of the qualified electors residing in the district, called for the specific purpose of obtaining such approval. This election as set forth in Section 4(e) applies only to the second power of Englewood to prohibit the use and maintenance of out-houses, privies, septic tanks or other unsanitary structures or appliances. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons the final declaratory judgment is
REVERSED.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dion Michael Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987)…seeks to protect a particular class or remedy a special problem, or other relevant factors. See Webb, 398 So. 2d at 824; De Bolt v. Dept, of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 427 So. 2d 221, 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Englewood Water District v. Tate, 334 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Accordingly, after first applying the Block-burger test, the court then must consider the presumption so created in light of any relevant factors that may indicate a contrary legislative intent. In light of this conclusion,…
-
Arrie Lee Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1978)…from an examination of a statute as a whole, rather than any one part thereof. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water & Reclamation District, 274 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1973); State v. Hayles, 240 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1970); Englewood Water District v. Tate, 334 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). An examination of Section 27.54 in its entirety reflects that the enactment relates solely to operation expenses of the public defenders’ offices, such as for employment of personnel and travel expenses. It is clear, therefore, t…
-
Payne v. City OF Miami, 927 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…mmunity as a whole. The meaning of the Comprehensive Plan must be gleaned from its plain language. If the intent of the drafters is clear from the language, it is the court’s duty to give [*911] effect to that intent. Englewood Water Dist. v. Tate, 334 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Furthermore, when the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984). The intent of the drafters of the “Port of Miami River” element of Miami’s Co…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191 (Fla. 1928)
- State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)
- Smith v. Ryan, 39 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1949)
- Scenic Hills Util. Co., Inc. v. City OF Pensacola, 156 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)