ISAAC CALVIN BARR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant Barr challenged his 60-year robbery sentence and 6-month contempt sentence. The court affirmed the robbery conviction but reversed the contempt conviction, finding the trial judge improperly presided over the contempt hearing despite not witnessing the alleged disrespect.
The contempt conviction is reversed because the trial judge did not see or hear the conduct in the actual presence of the court, making summary punishment under direct criminal contempt rules improper. Additionally, a 6-month contempt sentence requires jury trial protection. The robbery conviction and sentence are affirmed.
[1] A sentence of sixty years for robbery does not exceed the statutory limit of 'life' merely because the defendant's life expectancy is less than sixty years.
[2] A criminal contempt conviction is fatally defective if the trial judge did not personally witness or hear the conduct constituting the contempt.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court "saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of the court."”
Establishes the requirement for direct criminal contempt that the judge must personally witness the conduct
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter being sentenced to 60 years for robbery, appellant called the trial judge a "son-of-a-bitch." The judge did not hear these comments, but the bai…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Life Expectancy cases and more on FLexlaw
McNULTY, Chief Judge.
Appellant appeals a 60-year sentence for robbery and a 6-months sentence for contempt for calling the trial judge a son-of-a-bitch.
His assault on the robbery sentence, on the ground that it exceeds the statutory limit of “life” since his life expectancy is less than 60 years, is patently without merit. No error appearing otherwise on the robbery conviction, the judgment and sentence therefor are left undisturbed.
The conviction for contempt, however, is fatally defective. It undisputedly appears that at the sentencing on the aforementioned robbery, and after having heard his sentence, appellant uttered the words “son-of-a-bitch” towards the court. The trial judge admits that he did not hear these comments, although the bailiff and other persons in the courtroom did. The bailiff conferred with the trial judge and brought the matter to the court’s attention. The court then ordered appellant returned before him and cited him for contempt. He thereupon summarily imposed an additional sentence of five years for the contempt to be served consecutively with the robbery sentence.
After a recess, the court reconsidered and set aside the judgment and sentence for contempt. He immediately conducted an evidentiary hearing and, after taking testimony including that of appellant, found appellant guilty of direct criminal contempt. He promptly sentenced appellant to a term of six months in the county jail, again to run consecutively with the robbery sentence. Those proceedings cannot stand.
Rule 3.830, RCrP, relating to “direct criminal contempt,” provides that criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court “saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of the court.” Here, as noted above, the trial judge did not hear the comments of the alleged contemnor. There was, therefore no direct criminal contempt.
If anything, appellant’s utterances constituted “indirect” criminal contempt within the purview of Rule 3.840, RCrP, relating to actions outside the presence of the court. Significantly, subsection 5 of that rule provides that: “If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge he shall disqualify himself from presiding at the hearing. Another judge shall be designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.” Having not heard or directly witnessed the contempt herein, therefore, the trial judge ought not to have presided over the plenary hearing summarily held as aforesaid.
Parenthetically, we point out that a judge may not impose a sentence of six months or greater upon a judgment of guilty of contempt unless a jury trial has been afforded the accused.1 The sentence imposed for the contempt herein, being precisely for six months, was therefore also defective. We are certain that these considerations will be taken into account on remand.
In view whereof, the judgment and sentence entered and imposed herein for the offense of robbery should be, and they are hereby, affirmed. The judgment and sentence entered and imposed herein for the offense of contempt, however, should be, and they are hereby, reversed; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. . See Aaron v. State (Fla.1973), 284 So. 2d 673.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Martinez v. State, 339 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…o. 2d 365 (Fla.3d DCA1974). Our court, in passing, has also cited Aaron for the proposition that a judge may not impose a sentence of six months or greater upon a judgment of contempt unless the accused has been afforded a jury trial. Barr v. State, 334 So. 2d 636 (Fla.2d DCA1976). On the other hand, we have also specifically rejected the contention that a defendant was entitled to a jury trial in contempt proceedings in which he received a six month sentence. Butler v. State, 330 So. 2d 244 (Fla.2d DCA1976)…
-
Woodie v. Campbell, 960 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…committed in- the court’s actual presence. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.830 (2006) (“A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of the court.”); Barr v. State, 334 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), receded from on other grounds by Martinez v. State, 339 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (reversing the appellant’s conviction for direct criminal contempt because the judge did not hear the appellant call him a son-of-a-bitch; onl…
-
Davila v. State, 100 So. 3d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…without hesitation.2 See Payne v. State, 486 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (reversing a direct criminal contempt conviction when the judge heard a one-word expletive, not the alleged comment which two witnesses claimed to have heard); Barr v. State, 334 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (reversing contempt conviction where the court did not hear the comments allegedly made by the defendant), receded from on other grounds, Martinez v. State, 339 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).3 In this case, the court did not hear…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Aaron v. State, 284 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1973)