M. W. B., A CHILD, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Three consolidated juvenile cases challenge whether a trial judge could impose a mandatory three-year minimum commitment under Florida Statute 775.087 for firearm possession. The court held that juveniles cannot be "convicted" as required by the statute, and juvenile commitments must be indeterminate under F.S. 39.11(4), making such mandatory minimums jurisdictionally improper.
The court held that F.S. 775.087(2) is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings because juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent cannot be considered "convicted" of a crime, which is the essential prerequisite of the statute. Additionally, F.S. 39.11(4) requires that any commitment to the Division of Youth Services be for an indeterminate period, making mandatory minimum terms jurisdictionally improper.
[1] Commitments of juveniles to the Division of Youth Services must be for an indeterminate period of time.
[2] A mandatory minimum sentence under F.S. …
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“any commitment to the Division of Youth Services shall be for an indeterminate period of time”
Establishes the statutory requirement that juvenile commitments cannot have fixed minimum terms, making mandatory minimums jurisdictionally improper.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThree juveniles were adjudicated delinquent upon multiple charges, including charges involving possession of a firearm, after entering pleas of nolo c…
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BOYER, Chief Judge.
Three cases, all of them involving juveniles, have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. The issue in all three cases is identical, to wit: Whether the judge of the juvenile division of the circuit court committed error in imposing a “mandatory” three year minimum term of commitment pursuant to F.S. 775.087. Two of the cases involve the same factual situation. In all three cases, appellants were adjudicated guilty upon multiple charges to which they entered pleas of nolo contendere. One of the charges for which each appellant was found guilty entailed the presence of a firearm. On that charge, the trial judge, feeling that he was bound by the provisions of F.S. 775.087, committed each appellant to the Division of Youth Services for a period of not less than three years.1 Since none of the appellants specifically reserved the right to appeal the legality of the three year terms of commitment at the time of the entry of the pleas of nolo contendere and orders of commitment, this Court must resolve the issues on a jurisdictional basis.2
F.S. 39.11(4) provides that “any commitment to the Division of Youth Services shall be for an indeterminate period of time * * * ” Therefore, any order of commitment which places a juvenile with the Division of Youth Services for a term other than an indeterminate period of time is beyond the scope of the court’s jurisdiction.
We are also of the view that F.S. 775.087(2) is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings. The provisions of that statute apply only to persons convicted of any one of certain specified crimes. A juvenile who is adjudicated a delinquent child cannot be considered to have been convicted of a crime. F.S. 39.10(5). Thus, the essential prerequisite of F.S. 775.087(2) (i. e. conviction) cannot possibly be met by a juvenile who has been adjudicated to be delinquent. This holding is, of course, applicable solely to juveniles and juvenile proceedings.
Accordingly, these consolidated cases are reversed and remanded to the judge of the juvenile division of the circuit court for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
RAWLS and McCORD, JJ., concur. . F.S. 775.087(2) provides in pertinent part: “Any person who is convicted of any murder, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping, escape, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, or aircraft piracy, or any attempt to commit the aforementioned crimes, and who had in his possession a ‘firearm,’ as defined in subsection 790.001(6), or ‘destructive device,’ as defined in subsection 790.001(4), shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of three years.”
. See Hand v. State, Sup.Ct.Fla.1976, 334 So. 2d 601.
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T.S.W. v. State, 489 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…an adjudication by the court that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act, including a violation of chapter 316 or chapter 322, shall constitute a “conviction” as that term is used in chapter 322. Appellant argues by analogy from M.W.B. v. State, 335 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which held that the three-year minimum mandatory sentence for a “conviction” of specified crimes while in possession of a firearm is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings, and Jackson v. State, 336 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976),…
Authorities Cited
- Hand v. State, 334 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976)